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PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT 
William P. Lyons 
-"The true test of civilization is, not 
the census, nor the size of cities, nor 
the crops - no, but the kirul of man 
the country tllrns out." (Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Society and Solitude1 ) 
INTRODUCTION 
War is like a ganl(' of clH'ss. It is a 
(·ont(,lItioll I)('tw('('n two or mort' 
States, through their armed forces, for 
the purposes of overpowering each 
other and imposing such conditions of 
peace as the victor pleases. War is a 
fact recognizcd, and with regard to 
many points rrgulated, but not esta· 
)'IiFllt'o hy intt'rnational law. Its pur· 
pnSt' is tI) <1t'sl roy or n'move Illl' 
('Iwmy's will or lIIt'ans 10 fight. In dlt'SS 
WI' render impOh'nt or capture suffi-
cient of ih"e opponent's pieces to force 
his king into a position from which the 
only escape is capture. In war we fol-
low the same pattern; we destroy or 
capture his means to fight, his men and 
material, and force his leaders into 
a position from which the only outlets 
are death or surrender. Our opponent 
is, of course, striving to do the same. 
"If there be war, let it be in my 
time, that my children may have 
peace.":! Th!'se words by Thomas Paine 
should he the slogan of every adult 
American male today. We do 110t want 
war, but war is as old as the world, 
and records of it are found throughout 
the human race. It will never cease to 
demand consideration if we draw our 
conclusions from past events and the 
nns!'ttled conditions at present. The nu-
ckar age and wars of national libera-
tion hayt' in thrmselvt's added a new 
perspective to armed conflict. 
During the hysteria of war there is 
no more helpless and appealing figure 
than that of a prisoner of war. 
Figl;ling 1111'n spl'ak of "tht, fortlllll's of 
wm." and dt'dare that it is lIt'ithl'r 
dishonorable nor heroic to he takt'll 
prisoner. In combat, luck cannot smilt' 
on all participants, ann some art' hound 
Lo lose. Thl' man lakl'll ('aptive is one of 
the unlucky-a soldier of misfortllll!'. 
Because he is at the mercy of the 
dt'taining belligerent, the prisoner is 
suhjrcted to many deprivations and 
hardships. Often he is trrated crudly, 
sometimes hy physical means and at 
other times hy more suhtle psycholog-
ical techniques. Ont' thing is dear, 
howeyer; cruelty is no mOllopoly of Ihe 
past. TIll' 20th century has horne wit-
II!'SS to such treatment of the helpless 
prisoner aF would have made many 
"oleler harharisms appt'ar mild hy ('om-
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parison. Atroc-ities hav(' not he!'n inlPr-
mitt!'nt and casual, as they spring both 
from the sadism of individuals and 
from a conscious group system which 
actively rejects, subverts, and destroys 
standards of conduct and aims at de-
grading human values. In hardly any 
war has the lot of the prisoner of 
war been a happy one. In almost every 
war, criminal individuals and cruel 
governments have added to the misery 
of helpless people who are at their 
mercy. 
Let no one be misled. As it so 
aptly put in the ninth verse of the 
fourth chapter of Lamentations, "They 
that he slain by the sword are bcttcr 
off than they that be slain with hun-
ger." Death on the battlefield is far bet-
ter than the slow death of an enemy 
prison camp. 
Americans have participated in many 
wars, and many American have become 
prisoners of war. Most have survived 
- and most have survived with honor. 
With very few cxc!'ptions the standards 
of the American fighting man have 
r!'mained unchallenged. 
This pap!'r proposes to inv!'stigate 
thoroughly tl\(· Code of Conc!lIC't for the 
U.S. Al"m!'1i Fon'!'s ano its J"(·l:ttion to 
pri,;om'rs of war. It is hop('d thnt 
through this res('arch. uns\\"ers to the 
following questions can be formulated: 
Dol'S a nce-o exist for a Code? Ano if 
so, dol'S till' pn'sl'lii Code fulfill that 
need? 
It has heen over 11. years since 
Preside-nt Eisenhowe-r i!isue-d his Exe-c-
utive Order pre-scribing the Code of 
Conduct for all members of the Armed 
Forces. Since that time there ha!i heen 
little cause or little opportunity to con-
sid!'r the e-ffl'cl of the- Code within the 
military estahlishml'nt. Today, ill yie-\\" 
of th!' Unite-Ii States im'oh-('m('nt in 
South('ast Asia, it se-l'lllS timdy to ('x-
amine the- Codl' ill light of its intl'lItions 
and its accomplishml'nts. 
I - STANDARDS OF 
CONDUCT FOR THE 
FIGHTING MAN 
Background. In time of peare- the 
rights of belligerents should he secur('d 
hy such agret'mrnts as are likdy to hr 
followrd in time of war. As such, mil-
itary cOin-entions are efficient, human 
ways of introducing in thr miclst of 
war as much Illllmlllnrss as possihh· in 
thr relations of two or morr hrlli~e-r­
e-nts. They in themselvrs do not fur-
nish all thl' answers, but thry servr as 
logical guides for those s('eking further 
solutions to the al!e--old prohlrm of 
human rights unci suffering clming 
pe-riods of turmoil. .The srntimrnts of 
humanity ha\:r also found a pla!'(' in 
tl1(' relationship of hl'lligerrnts with 
each other in the form of these inter-
national agreements and have had a 
wholesome effect on the care and treat-
ment of prisoners of war. 
In 1907 the Hague Regulations es-
tahlished rulcs prrtaining to captidty 
in war. These regulations led to thl' 
Gl'ne\'a COlln'ntions of 1929 anel 1919 
whirh set forth in detail thr ri~hts and 
protp('tions which sholllcl II(' affnrcll'd 
prison!'rs. Th(,)" do not spc'('ilic'ally pn'-
~('ril1(' till' concluet whit'll a nation may 
n'quirp of its pcrsonnrl who may hl'-
('oml' prisoners. ho\\'e-\'rr. as thi:; is 
ri~ht fully h'ft to thl' c1i!'c'J"(!tion of the 
sO\'('n'ign pO\\'l'r. 
To cli:;c'ounlg(' cl!'sl'rtion cluring the 
\{I'\·olution. thC' United Statrs estah-
lished tlw drath penalty for those 
prisoners \\'ho, after capture, took up 
arms in the- sen'ice of the enemy. 
Duress or coercion was recognized as 
mitigating only in event of thrratened 
imm('diate' dcath. This was the first 
American drfinitioll of rrquired prison-
PI" ('onduet.1 Til thl' Trraty of 17R5 
h(,tw('!'n til(' Unitl'd StatC's anel Prussia. 
artic'h· XXIV pro\'ic!es furthc'r evidl'nc'l' 
of a growing concern for prisoners of 
war.:! No standard of conduct was pre· 
RrrillC'd. hut rOlI<1itions of confinrment, 
l'an'. and paroll' wl're outlined. 
Durin/! thr Civil War ahout 3,170 
F('drrals hrld hy the South joined the 
Southern Armirs and 5,452 prisoners 
from the South joined the Federal 
Army.:! 
Prisoner conduct after capture was 
Jl1I'ntionC'C1 in War Department Gl'neral 
Ordl'r No. 207.:~ July lR6a. which pro· 
\'ilhl. :tmonl! otllt'r thinl!~. that it was 
tIll' duty of a ]lri~OIH'r of war to escapl'. 
Pro~rcution for misconduct was based 
on thrre criteria:4 
-miRronduct whrrl' there is no 
dur!':o;s or !:I)('rdon. 
-artive partiripation in combat 
a~ainst F!'dpral fon'l's. 
-failure to return voluntarily. 
Nine years after the Civil War, a 
dl'claration establishing the rights of 
pril'oners was drafted by the Congress 
of nrussels (1874.). It was signed by 
] 5 nationR, nonr of which ratified it.a 
Thl' "ast numhl'l' of pl'l'sons who arc 
takl'll prisolll'1's of war makl'S the mat· 
ter of handling them properly a mat· 
trr of p:reat importancr. More than 
:~O().ooo WI'I'I' ('apturl't1 durill/! tIll' war 
of 1Il711-71; ahlml lIl().I)(11l durin/! 1111' 
Turl'o·Prussian stru::rglrs and Busso· 
Japam'sl' War. During World War J 
the United States captured tl8,976 
Gl'1'lJlans while 4,120 American soldil'rs 
WI'fe captured." In World War II the 
1I1litrd States was opposl'd hy Japan, 
a nation which had not hecn a signa· 
tory to the Grneva Conventions. While 
the Japanese madr a token show of 
following the accepted Conventions, 
tIll' figures show the grim results. Of 
soml' 17,000 Americans who sun'en· 
dered on nataan and Corregidor, only 
a mere 5,000 livrd through the 3% 
yrars of ca}>ti\'it)'.7 A total of 129,701 
Amrricans wrre captured hl' the Axis 
enemy, and of thesr 14,090 died in 
the I'Ill'my's prison camps.s 
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The Combatant and the Cap. 
tive. One of the major worries plagu. 
ing military personnel, should they he· 
come prisoners of war, is that' of the 
relationship between military responsi. 
hility and personal survival. Survival 
in prisoner·of.war camps may involve 
instinctual rather than rational be· 
havior, There is no other situation in 
the world where human association 
produces a greater possihility of inhu· 
mane treatment of man hy his fellow: 
man.!! Regardless of the circumstancrs, 
upon military personnel, the drfrnders 
of order. restR a 11('avy reRponsihility. 
The grt'all'st sl'rvil'l' thl'y ('an rl'IIlII'f 
as prisoners is to remain true to tllC'm· 
selves and to serve with sill'nce and 
courage 'in tht' military way. 
The services may ha\'l' the crt'am of 
Amrrican manhood, hut, at hest, this 
is a cross section of Ihl' communities 
of the nation, The sl'rvires can only 
hope to inculcale and rt'new in the 
American fighting man thl' dl'sire to 
live his life on the hattlefield and in the 
prison camps, if nere~<;ary. in such a 
way Ihat whall'\'rr hap]l('l\>, hI' can hr 
self.respecting and free of guilt. 
Whl'n an illlii\'icillni nCl'l'pts lht' 
duty to hI' a Illl'mhl'r of the Arll1rd 
Forcrs of thr Unill'd Stales, Ill' also 
aecrpls till' possihility thaI nt soml' 
indeterminate date he may lose his 
Ii fe while defending the interests of 
the American people. This is aptly ap· 
parl'nt in the Oath taken by officers of 
the United States Armed Forces, en· 
actrd by Congress on 13 May 1884., as 
follows in part: 
"I, A.B., do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that 1 will support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and do· 
mestic; that 1 will bear true faith and 
allrgiance to the same .... So help me 
God".l0 
What seems to he forgotten, in some 
cases, is that the Oath of Allegiance 
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dot's not have any blank spaces for 
the individual to fill in stating his 
prrferencrs as to when, whNe, how, or 
if he prefers to die. It has been said 
that the taking of this oath is the 
pivotal fact which changes the indi-
vidual's status from that of civilian to 
that of soldier.l1 
It is a general rult' of law, long 
rl'co:rnizrd, that a soldier takt'n pris-
onN relllains a 1ll1'1ll1)('r of thl' sl'n·ir('. 
('nlitled to all rights and privill'gl's, 
and rl'sponsibl(' for all ohligations to 
his country except those rendered im-
possihll' ,or i1I('gal. Tn the first plae-I', 
don't i('l ('aptured, or at !t'ast 
don't surrl'lHl('r while thl're is any pos-
sihle mrans of resistance. However, if 
ovt'rcome by superior force, you are 
still a soldier. If a soldier is captured 
drspitr his efforts to rt'sist, he must give 
110 mor(' than his name, rank, serial 
numhl'r. and date of birth. To give any 
otht'r information than what is author-
ized might w('ll jeopardize the life 
of comradrs. Conceivably this can 
mushroom into tht' actual losing of the 
war. It ('(In W(·ll h(' thr mod('rn vNsion 
of Franklin'~ (HInge: "For want of a 
nailthl' ~hol' wa~ 1(l~L. ... " 
Tht' prisont'r-of-war sto('kade is only 
an I'xt('nsion of the hattlrfirld wJWf(' 
till' prisoIH'r must he taught to carryon 
the struggle with the only weapons 
remaining - faith and couragC'. He 
has an ohligation to continue to help 
his nation in any way possihlC'_ and 
that nation has a right to expect a 
soldirr to giw his life for his country, 
and it mattC'rs not where tht' call comes 
to him - on the battlt'field or in a foul 
prisoner-of-war compound in some 
strangc Jand. 
Although a prisoner is temporarily 
removed from direct. contact with his 
own command during internm('nt, he 
is, upon return to his own army, suh-
jcct to trial hy court-martial "for 
offt'nst's as criminal acts or injurious 
conduct committC'd during his captivity 
agaim:f otht'rs of his comradrs in the 
same status."l!! As Abraham Lincoln 
counsrled, mC'n should utter or do 
nothing for which thry would not will-
ingly hr held responsible through time 
and in eternity. 
In short, thC' prisoner is always a 
soldit'r and tl)(' t'thie-al behavior of 
personnC'1 in thC' hands of tIl(' ('nC'lI1)" 
is a gra\'c responsihililY whil"h nil 
American ('an ignore. Past and fulun' 
condurt 'of raptured prrsol1nrl mllst 
he analyzed exclusively on the basis 
of national interest and srrurit y and 
not on l)('rsol1al snrvi\'al considrratiolls. 
Human sympathy must 110t be allo\\'(·d 
to pervert principle nor excuse weak-
ness or had judgment. But it is. of 
courst', to he remembered that thr 
survival of prisoners of war is aSsiimed to 
be within the realm of national interest 
and security. More important is the fact 
that the prisoners are still citizens of their 
country, and as they are presumably 
coming ba<i<, their welI-being and morale 
must be of importance.l 3 
That a pri~OI/('r-of-war ('amp is a 
:<afl' plae(· to n·lax and ":<\\"('at (lilt 1111' 
war" is a myth. Thl' majority of Ih(ll'\' 
who are fortunatl" C'nough 10 hC' ;lliw 
at the conclusion of the war will have 
('xternal or internal scars that they 
will carry to th(·ir graves. Life in a 
prisoner-of-war camp offers many 
IlII'ans for continuing tlH' struggle. 
Ingenuity_ r1eveflH'SS, rt'sourcefulnl"ss, 
patiC'ncl', and courage arc the weapons. 
Drf('ats and retrC'ats will occur. but the 
important thing is that till! struggle he 
continued by whatever means are 
feasible at the moment and under the 
given conditions. It must he the duty 
of those who arc captured to attempt 
to escap(' at the first opportunity. Therl" 
arc few placl's where even the strongest 
ml'n disintegrate physically, mentally, 
and morally as 'rapidly as in a 
prisonrr-of-war camp.14 
Korea Prompts Code. During 
World War II the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and China pledged 
tlH'ir determination in the Cairo Pec-
laration of Decemher 19t1·3 that Korea 
would. "in due course" hecome free 
and incll'pl'nt!('nt. Thi~ pll'dge wa~ sub-
~('rilll'd to hy the Sovil't {fnion when it 
1II'I'lan't! \l'al" a~:tinst Jap:tn 011 B 
AllglIst l().\!}.t:; 
Following the Japanese SIlI"\'('ll(lel", 
11ll' Soviet forces entering Korea on 
12 AlIAII~L 19·1·!} acel'pkcl the ~1I1'T(,IHh'r 
"f .IaJlalll'~I' fOf('es lIorth of Ihe :lBlh 
paralld. American troops landed on 8 
Septemher and accepted the surrender 
oUh(' Japanese troops in the southern 
part of the peninsula on the following 
clay. The United States did not con'.. 
kmplal<' a lastin~ division of Korea 
along this linl', whidl was an accidental 
line resulting from the exigencies of 
the war_ However, this arrangement 
quietly hecame a barrier, severing 
1,:~OO years of normal interehange be-
t\\'('('11 all parts of Korl'a, unlil 25 Junl' 
10!lO \l'lll'n th!' So\'iet-I'qllippl'l!. tmillel!. 
:11111 clin'I'h'1I Nllrth Klln'nn Annic's 
:<t I'Ill'k till' Ih'pllhli(' of Klln'a withollt 
\\':trnin~. el'Ossing thl' 38th }laralll'l in 
filII fOl"e('. 
After the United Nations forces had 
c1estroYl'd the North Korean Armies 
and decimated the Chinese forcl's, 
which had entered the war from Red 
China, the Soviet Union on 23 June 
1951 proposed a truce.IG At 1000 hours, 
27 July 1953, after 2 years and 17 
days, the Korean Armistice Agreement 
was signed at Panmunjom,17 The guns 
were silenced and the fighting ceased, 
hut a clear-cut victory had not been 
won hy either side. 
Every war has its disturbing after-
math, and there is always another side 
to the coin of victory. If the victory is 
not clearly imprinted and the war has 
ended in what seems like a stalemate, 
the coin becomes suspeet. In any event, 
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there is usually a postwar inventory.IS 
One and a half million Americans 
went to Korea to fight and 7,190 were 
captured by the enemy. Of this number 
6,556 were Army~ 263 were Air Force, 
231 were Marine Corps and 40 were 
Navy personneJ.19 
Following the Korean Armistice 
Agreement, the program of repatria-
tion of prisoners of war began with 
Opl'ration Little Switch. wherl'in 127 
!'oldiers (and 22 other Americans) 
were rl'turned to U.S. control durill~ 
thl' ,i('rio,l 19-25 April ] 953. Til Big 
Switch the Commullists returned Lo our 
~ide the remaining American surviving 
prisoners of war during the period 5 
August to 6 September 195;~.2o 
During the war, 1}.,tI.28 American 
servicemen survived thl' hell of Com-
munist prisoner-of-war compounds. Of 
these, 3,973 were members of tlH' 
Army. 22-\· of the Air Forel', 200 of thl' 
Marine Corps, and 31 of the Navy.!!1 A 
total of 2.730 Americans did not re-
turn.!!!! 
Thl' r('al and lI'rrihl(' storY is tole! ill 
the contrast Ill't\l'c'c'n our st;u!!gll' wiih 
thl' Gl'rmuns in World War·IT and our 
~truggle with the Communists 111 
Korea: 
In World War II, of the total re-
ported mi~sinl! in action hy the 
American Army, 18 percent ~ot baek 
safely to oilr Ii II C'S, 79 percent were 
later returned a live as prisoners of 
war, and only 3 percent died. 
But in Korea, of those reported 
missing in action by the American 
Army, 12 percent ~ot back to their 
units, only 30 perroent lived to he ex-
changed as prisoners of war; and an 
almost unbelievable 38 percent died 
behind Communist lines.23 
This is a higher prison!'r d('ath rate 
than that of any of our preyious wars. 
including the Hcvolution, in which 
it is estimated that about 33 percent 
of the prisoners died.24 
What was even more shocking was 
the faet that almost one out of every 
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three American prisoners in Korea was 
guilty of some sort of collaboration 
with the enemy.2:i The degree of col-
laboration ranged from such serious 
offenses as writing anti-American prop-
aganda and informing on comrades to 
the relatively innocuous offcnse of 
hroadcasting Christmas greetings home 
and thereby putting the Communists 
in a favorable light. Futhermore, during 
Ill(' ('ntire KOrt'an eonnict, not one U.S. 
scn'iceman cscaped from a permancnt 
('llI'IllY prison camp and 5nccC'ssfnlly 
madl' his way /Jilek 10 fril'lully Jjll('s.211 
Troubled hy the problem of col-
laboration, the Defense Dcpartment 
IH'gan studies Oil 3,300 returnl~d Ameri-
can prisonC'rs to find out who had 
done what and why. By joint action 
of the services, all of the prisoners re-
covC'red were scrrenrd by military in-
telligence agencies. Of the 565 whosr 
conduct was questioned, 373 were 
cleared or the charges dropped after 
investigation. Of the remaining 192 sus-
pects, 68 were separated from the ser-
vices, 3 resigned, one received repri-
mand, 2 were given restricted assign-
ments, and 11 were convicted by court-
martial.27 No case was brought for 
court-martial action in which there was 
evidence of duress, brainwashing, or any 
other type of coercion. There were also 
21 men who chose to stay with the 
Communists. Adding these to the 11 
convicted men makes a total of at least 
32 Americans who did not measure up. 
Army figures indicated that 15 percent 
of the Americans had actively collabo-
rated with the Communists, and only 5 
percent had vigorously resisted.2 8 
All in all, sinister and regrettable 
things happened in the prison camps of 
Korea. Evidence indicated that the high 
death rate was not due primarily to 
Communist maltreatm('nt, that it could 
be accounted for largely by the ignor-
ance or the callousness of the prisoners 
themselves.29 
In every war but one in which the 
United States has participated, the con-
duct and personal behavior of its ser-
vicemen who became prisoners of war 
presented no unforeseen problcms and 
gave rise to no particular concern in 
the country as a whole. In none of 
them was there such a large breakdown 
of morale or widespread collaboration 
with the captors. Moreover, regardless 
of the rigors of the camps, in ewry war 
but one, some of the prisoners managed 
through ingennity, daring. and plain 
good Inck to escape. That one war was 
the Korean war.30 
Accordingly, the Army soon began 
collecting data for a formal stndy of 
the behavior of its personnel taken as 
prisoners of war in Korea. A major 
result of this study was the promulga-
tion on 17 Augnst 1955, by President 
Eisenhower, of the new Code of Con-
duct for members of the Armed Forces 
of the United States. 
The Code of Conduct was - like the 
('v('nls in Kor.('a· that inspir('d it -
rOlllpl('trly linpr('('('(knll'cl. N('\·pr h('fofl' 
had n Prl'l'idl'III fOllnd il 11I'('I'S5ary In 
clarify or r('slatl' thl' principles of ron-
duct for military personnel. The fact 
that it was necessary to spell out what 
had always been tuk!'n for granted by 
Americans as constituting the unques-
tioned duties and obligations of the 
fighting man indicated how greatly 
the Korean war differed from the seven 
major wars that this nation had pre-
viously fought. 
II - THE CODE OF 
CONDUCT 
Purpose. The majority of honor-
ahle professions have some form of 
('re('d or cod(' of conduct. l\Iore timrs 
than not it is an unwritten creed, being 
based primarily on mutual understand-
ing and professional pride. Some pro-
fessions, however, have formal creeds 
or oaths of long standing such as the 
Hippocratic oath of the medical pro-
fession which dates from about 400 
B.C.l 
On 7 August 1954 Secretary of De-
frnse Charles E. Wilson created an ad 
hoc committee under the chairmanship 
of Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, to study the con-
duct of military prrsonnel during com-
hat - particularly whilc in a prisoner-
of-war status.2 After intensive study 
and consultation with some 68 civic 
h'aders, formrr prisoners of war, and 
Government representatives, the com-
mittee issued its 82-page report.3 
On thc basis of this rcport Sccrctary 
Wilson, on 17 May 1955, appointed the 
Defcnse Advisory Committee on Pris-
oners of War. The main purpose of this 
group, which was composed of ten 
membrrs - five civilians and five mili-
tary, from all services, with Secretary 
Burgess as Chairman - was to provide 
memhers of thc Armed Forces with a 
simplr, ('asily undrrstood rodr to gov-
1'1"11 thrir ('omluet n:; Amrricmdighting 
1111'11:1 
The ('ollllnittee mpt f n·qlll·ntly for 
over 2 months, and on 29 July 1955 it 
presentrd to the Secretary a proposed 
codc of conduct.:; Nineteen days later, 
on 17 August 1955, President Eisen-
hower promulgated Executive Order 
Number 10631 whcrein he described 
for the Armed Forces of the United 
States a six-point Code of Conduct. 
This Code of Conduct was the first 
clearly defined standard of action ap-
plicahle to American prisoners after 
capture'. This set of principles was de-
signed to mold a new set of fundamen-
tal attitudes for U.S. service personnl'l 
with a view to helping them and their 
coulltry, as wrll. survive any future 
conflict. The Advisory Committec 
whieh drcw up the Code offered the 
following in support of their proposi-
tion when it was forwarded for the 
Prrsident's signature: ".We can find 
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no basis for making recommendations 
other than on the principles and foun-
dations which have made America 
free and strong, and on thc qualities 
which wc associate with men of char-
actrr and integrity."o 
The Unitrd States had finished a 
war' with an enemy who had fought 
not only on the hattlefidd, but in thc 
prison camps as weIl, by manipulating 
the minds of its captives. The Commu-
nists had looked upon a prisoncr of war 
as an asset of the military machine 
without respect or regard for his rights 
as a human heing.7 The whole prisoner-
of-war question was changrd complete-
ly hy their insidious and inhumane 
methods. Our Goyernment and the mili-
tary services rralized that our fighting 
man not only had to he taught how to 
fight physically, hut hc must know how 
to fight back mrntally and morally as 
weIl. 
While strrtl, thr Code of Conduct is 
tempprrcl hy a rrcop:llitiOlf of thl' pas-
sihility of 1'lWIIlY dl'pnn'ity ;tnll hy 
a!'i'Urm1l'I'S of ju!'ticl' for thOi'l' pri>,olll'r>' 
who hrrak undl'r torturr. It consists of 
six articles in simple languagl' that any 
American can understand. It starts with 
the sentence, "I am an American fight-
ing man"; arid concludes with the sen-
tcnce, "I wiII trust in my God and in 
the United States of America." In be-
twet'n these two doctrines the service-
man wiII plcdge that he will never sur-
rt'nder of his own free wiIl, that he wiII 
endeavor to escape if caught, that as a 
prisoner he wiII not betray his feUow 
prisont'rs, and that he wiII refuse to 
give any information beyond his name, 
rank, service number, and date of 
hirth. 
By the adoption of the Code, unified 
guidance and a basic philosophy were 
provided for all the services - guid-
ance to be utilized as an instructional 
\"(·hirle to aid future prisoners of war 
in their fight against an enemy who 
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may not only seek their land but their 
lives, minds, loyalty, and allegiance. 
The acquired mutual respect can de-
velop the interreliance and unity of 
purpose which is essential to victory in 
battle and to resistance and survival in 
a POW camp: In essencl', the Code 
dol'S more than epitomize the moral 
guidelines tbat can sustain a soldier 
through many trials and tribulations; 
it also sets forth the basic rules that 
hopefully will enahle him to ~urvive 
until the day when adversity gives way 
to vindication and final victory.s 
The purpose of the Armed Forces 
Code of Conduct can be summed up as 
twofold: To protect, at whatever cost, 
the cause for which this country stands, 
and at the same tfme ensure the great-
('st hope and survival for the men who 
Sl'rve that cause.o 
The Articles. 
AI'li('lt' I - "I am :111 :\lIl1'ricall 
Fi)!hlill)! l\lan. I !'l'rn' ill Ihe Forcl'!' 
whie-II ~uard my country and our way 
or Ii re. I am prepared to give my Iifl' 
in thpir defense." 
Intent. A member of the 
Armed Forces is always a fighting 
man. As such, it is his sworn duty to 
oppose the enemies of the United 
States, regardless of the circumstances 
or hardships encountered, whether on 
the battlefield or in a prisoner-of-war 
camp. This article could be said to ex-
press the true feelings of each Ameri-
can sl'rviceman who has fought, suffer-
ed, or died in battle. The words them-
selves not only descrihe the spirit of 
the past, but of the future as well. Each, 
from the most s('nior to the most junior, 
must have sincere pride in his country 
and in the uniform he wears. He must 
fulfill his pledged and moral military 
obligations with conscientiousness and 
with honor. 
A point in article I which deserves 
special attention is the phrase, "/ am 
prepared to give my life . ... " The true 
and final test of an individual's "pre-
paredness" is that he is willing to risk 
death in carrying out his duties. When 
an American says he is prepared 10 
give his life iIi defense of his country, 
it should not only encompass d('ath in 
battle, but death at whatever place the 
situation dictates whether in or out of 
service.10 
Basic attitudes and everyday rOIl-
tines go a long way toward this end. 
The men who do their best with every 
assignment; who look for what needs 
to be done, and do it; who find ways 
to improve themselves and their work; 
who do all that is required and then 
some - these are the men who are 
prepared to give their lives. They are 
already doing so! 
Article I offers no difficulty in its 
interpretation of what is implied and 
what is expected of the military man 
or woman. TIl!' OfficI'r and Enlislmrnt 
Oath. thl' Constitution. and thl' hash-
principles upon which our country was 
founded offer adequate understanding. 
The President made it clear in his 
Executive Order that the words, "I am 
an American fighting man," apply to 
every member of the Armed Forces. 
Drpartment of Defense Directive 
1300.7, par. II, declares that the Code 
is applicable to all members of the 
Armed Forces at all times. The use of 
the phrase is' clearly a dramatic device 
uSl'd to emphasize that the reason for 
the existence of soldiers is to fight the 
country's enemies rather than limit the 
application of the Code to combat men 
only. 
Article II - "I will never sur-
render of my own free wiIl. If in com-
mand I will never surrender my men 
while thl'Y still have the means to re-
sist." 
Intent. As an individual, a 
member of the Armed Forces may 
never voluntarily surrender himself. 
When he is isolated and can no longer 
inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his 
duty to evade capttire and rejoin the 
nearest friendly forces. 
The rI'!;pom:ibility and authority of a 
commandl'r neVl'r extcnds to the sur· 
render of his command to the enemy 
while it has the power to resist or 
l'vade. Whell isolah,d, cut olI, or sur· 
rounded, a unit must continue to fight 
until Tl'liev('d or able to rejoin friendly 
forces hy breaking out, or by evading 
the enemy.ll 
This is one of the most controversial 
articles in that it implies "a lost, last 
stand," "fight to the last man," etc. 
Most military men will argue that if 
the situation so dictates and the odds 
are stacked so overwhelmingly against 
you, then it is better to live to fight 
:tnoth('r day than to commit obvious 
suit'idt'. 
AIlIOII/! tIl(' IllUIIY hazards of the mili· 
tary profession, the risk of capture 
by the enemy is just as much a possi· 
bility as death or injury. The fighting 
man accepts -these risks each and every 
time he enters combat in order to carry 
out his assigned mission. He should 
never sell himself short, however, by 
meekly surrendering just because the 
situation looks hopeless. 
There is a great difference between 
surrender and -being captured. To be 
captured is to be taken prisoner; sur· 
render means to give up. Under certain 
circumstances, an initial impression 
might indicate that surrender would 
appear to be thc proper course of ac· 
tion. However, from the standpoint of 
pure self.interest, the man who will· 
fully surrenders to the enemy is not 
only selling himself short, but his coun· 
try as well. It was pointed out hy the 
Advisory Committee which drafted the 
Code of Cond.uct that, "If individuals 
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and commanders were permitted to sur· 
render whenever a situation seems to be 
desperate it would become an open in· 
vitation to all weak of will or depressed 
of spirit." We cannot deny that some 
men - the "weak of will" - must be 
frequently reminded of their obliga. 
tions and compelled to do what is 
right and proper, ev('n though to do so 
is in their be.st interests. Just as train· 
ing drills are repeated until men re· 
spond to eml'r/!l'nci('s almost instinc· 
tively and do the right things despite 
confusion, the guidelines in article II 
can remind a fighting man not to give 
up when for the moment his situation 
seems hopeless. 
Article III - "If I am captured 
I will continue to resist by all means 
available. I will make every effort to 
escape and aid others to escape. I will 
accept n('ither parole nor special fa· 
vors from the enemy." 
lul('ul. TIl(' dUly or a 1111'111-
LeI' or thl' Armed Forces to ('ontillul' 
resistance 11)' all means at his disposal 
is not lessened by the misfortune or 
capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Con. 
v('ntion pertains and must be ex· 
plained. Article 82 provides as follows: 
A prisoner of war s~all be subject 
to the laws, regulations and orders in 
force in the armed forces of the De· 
taining Power; the Detaining Power 
shall be justified in taking judicial 
or disciplinary measures in respect of 
any offense committed by a prisoner 
of war against such laws, regulations 
or orders. However, no proceedings 
or punishments contrary to the pro· 
visions of this Charter shall be al· 
lowed. 
If any law, regulation or order of 
thc Detaining Power shall declare 
acts committed by a prisoner to be 
punishable, wherl!as the same acts 
would not be punishable if com· 
mitted by a member of the forces of 
the Dctaining Power, such acts shall 
entail disciplinary punishments only.12 
He will escape if able to do so and will 
assist others to escape. Parole agree' 
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ments are promises given the captor by 
a prisoner of war upon his faith and 
honor to fulfill stated conditions, such 
as not to bear arms or not to escape, in 
consideration of special privileges, us-
ually releases from captivity or less-
ened restraint. He will never sign or 
('nkr into a paroI!' agrcement_I!! 
No matter how hard he may have 
fought to prevent it, there is always 
IIIP chance Ihnt a fighling man IlIl1y I)(~ 
captuf('d by the enemy_ This in itself is 
no disgrace, so long as he extends the 
fight from the battlefield into the 
prisoner-of-war compound_ Using the 
only weapons still available to him -
his wits and his will - he can continue 
to fight. Courage, determination, pa-
tience, and faith - especially faith in 
one's self, one's country, and one's God 
- are the primary means to resist 
when other weapons are gone. 
Today and in the foreseeable future 
our enC'mies ar(', and most HkC'ly will 
r('main. r.ommuni~I~. c.nlllnl\lni~l~ at-
tl'llIpt all sorts of trich'ry, force, or 
other unorthodox methods to induce a 
prisoncr to obligate himself. One of 
their more subtle methods is thc offer 
of parole. 
The primary reason that the United 
States prohibits agreements is hecause 
the enemy never offers parole unless it 
is to his advantage. Secondly, the POW 
who enters into a parole agrC'ement 
with the enemy cannot be trusted hy 
his fellow prisoners, and mutual trust 
is most important in the battle to sur-
vive. 
Article IV - "If J bC'come a 
prisoner of war, I will k('('p faith with 
my fellow prisoners. I will give no in-
formation nor take part in any action 
which might he harmful to my com-
radC's. If I am s('nior, I will take com-
mand. T £ not, I will ohey the lawful 
ordC'rs of those appointed over me and 
will back them up in every way." 
-Intent. Informing. or any 
othC'r action to the detriment of a 
fellow prisoner, is despicable and is ex-
prC'ssly forbidden. Prisoners of war 
must ayoid helping thC' C'nemy and mar 
tlwrdorC' h(' madC' to suffC'r ('oC'rriyC' 
int"rro~ation. 
Strong ll'adership is essential to dis· 
ciplinC'. Without disriplin('. camp or-
ganization, rC'sistanc(', a 1111 (,\'(,11 sur-
vival may he impossihle. Personal hy-
gien(', camp sanitation, and ('are of 
sick and wounded arc impC'rativC'. Offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers of 
the United States will continuc to carry 
out their responsibilities and exercise 
their authority suhsC'quent to captun·. 
The senior line officer or noncommis-
sioned officer within the prisoner-of-
war camp or group of prisonrrs will 
assume command according to rank 
(a precC'dence) without regard to 
sC'n"irl'. This rC'sponsihility and acroun-
tahility may not hl' (·\";lIl"d. If tIl!' !'('n-
ior offic('r or noncolllmi~siolH'd Om('('r 
is incapacitated or unahle to act for 
any r('ason. command will Ill' assumed 
hy the next senior. If the foregoing 
organization cannot he effected, an or-
ganization of elected representatives, 
as provided for in articles 79-81, Gen-
('va Convention Relative to Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, or a covert organi-
zation, or hoth, will be formecl. 14 
Thc ronditions of life as a POW 
undC'r thr Communists emphasize the 
ne('d for leadership development predi-
cated upon the ahility to acquire and 
hold the support of subordinates on tlw 
hasis of an individual leader's rharnr-
t('r. (,Illotional pel"1'onality, j uclgmrnt. 
and powers of persuasion. 
There are three general types of of-
fC'n1'(,5 which are of hasic intC'rest to the 
~('I"\'ir(,1'"l!i OnC' type arisC's whC'n a 
prisoner sreks to take advantage of his 
fellow prisoners' misery. In the service 
vi!'w, a prisoner who informs to the 
enemy on other POW's, who steals 
from his sick huddies, who robs the 
drad. who obtains extra benefits from' 
the captors in exchange for monitoring 
or collaborating for his captors merits 
p\llli~llJnrnt. 
Tlll'n Ihrrr i~ till' tyP(' of crinw com· 
millt'd hy a fl'W ()fli('er~ UlIII nOllcom-
mh:~ionrd officers - abuse of thcir 
pOl'ition hy mi~guiding or failing to 
It'ad \\'h(,11 il was ill Ilwir POWl'I' 10 do 
1'0. This. too, merits punishment. 
TIl(' third type of crime is the trea-
!ion type, which is committed when a 
military man voluntarily furnishes in-
trlligrnce or propaganda materials to 
the rnemy. 
Article V - "When questioned, 
should I become a prisoner of war, I 
am hound to give only namr, rank, 
~l'l'vice numher, and date of hirth. I 
will ('\'1\(11' anl'\\,l'l'in~ fmlhl'r qUI'~tion~ 
III III(' ulmosl of m)' ahililY. I \\'iIImakl' 
110 oral or wrillrll ~Ialrllll'nl!i disloyal 
10 my ('Olllllry and it!i a1lirs or harmful 
In tlH'ir musl'." 
Intent. When qurstioned, a 
prisonel' of war is required hy the 
Grnr\'a Convention and permitted hy 
thi!i Code to disclose his namr, rank, 
sl'rvirr number, and date of birth. A 
)lri~OJwr of war may also communicatr 
with the enemy regarding his individu-
al health or welfare as a prisoner of 
war and, whrn appropriate, on routine 
matters of camp administration. Oral 
or writtrn confessions, whether true or 
falsI.', questionnaires, personal history 
statrmrnls. propaganda rrcordings and 
hroadcasl~_ appeals to olhrr prisonrrs 
of war, sif!nahlrps to peace or surrpn-
der appeals, self-criticisms, or any 
othpr oral or writtl'n communication on 
hehaIf of the rnrmy or critiral or harm-
ful 10 the United States, its AlIirs, the 
Armrd Forces, or other prisoncrs are 
forhiddrn. 
It is a violation of the Geneva Con-
vcntion to place a prisoner of war 
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undpr physical or mental torture or any 
other form of coercion to secure from 
him information of any kind. If, how-
e\'er_ a prisoner is suhjl'ctrd to such 
treatment, he will endrayor to avoid hy 
('\'rry means the discIo~ure of any in-
formation or the making of any state-
ment or thr prrformance of any action 
harmful to II\(' inll'resls of Ihe Unilr(l 
Statl's or its Allil's or \\'hieh will pro-
vide aid or comfort to the enemy. 
Tn view of a U.S.S.H. re~;prvation to 
article 85 of the Geneva Convention, 
the signing of a confession or the mak-
ing of a statempnt by a prisoner is 
likely to he uspd to convict him as a 
war criminal under the laws of his 
captors, This cOl1\'iction has the e[ect 
of removing him from the prisoner-uf-
war status and, according to Ill(' reser-
vation, denies him any protection un-
drr trrm~ of the Genpya Com'Plltion 
alld rl'patrialion ulltil a )lri~oll Sl'ntrllCl' 
is SPITed, The rl'srr\'alioll is as follows: 
The Union of So\'i('1 Socialist Rr-
puhlics does not ('onsider itself hound 
hy the ohligation which follows 
Article 85, to extend the application 
of the Convention to the prisoners of 
war who have hcrn convicted under 
thc law of the Dctaining Power, in 
accordance with the principles of the 
Nuremhurg trial, for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, it heing 
understood that persons convicted of 
such crimes must he suhjected to the 
conditions ohtaining in the country in 
question for those who undergo their 
punishment.1G 
The American serviceman is in-
structed to give to the enemy upon cap-
lurr. only his nmm~, rank, srrvice nU111-
her. and date of hirth, Anything that 
he thereafter gives the enemy, he gives 
upon his own responsibility, But it is 
ridiculous to suppose that a prisoncr is 
not pl~rmitted to !Ouy anything morc to 
his captors, and this is well understood 
hy each of the services. A man held 
in the helpless situation in which a 
POW finds himself must cooperate with 
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his captors by getting in line when 
required, by faIling out of formations, 
and by obeying the other routine POW 
camp order~. 
Thc framers of the Code agreed that 
a line of resistance must he drawn 
somewhere and accepted the name, 
rank, and 'service number provision of 
the Geneva Conv('ntions as the lim' of 
rl'~istal\(:(~. In the face of experieJl(:I" 
however, the Committee recognized 
that a POW may be suhjected to an 
extreme of cOl'rcion beyond his ability 
to resist. In this battle with the inter-
rogator the prisoner is driven from 
his first line of resistance and must be 
trained for resistance in successive posi-
tions. It was the Committee's conclusion 
that the inoh'ioual must make a final 
stano. HI' must not disclose vital mili-
tary information and above all may 
not oisplay, in woro or oped. oisloyalty 
to his country. his sen·ice. or his com-
mOI's.li 
Article VI - "I will never for-
get that I am an American ~ighting 
Man, responsible for my actions and 
dedicated to the principles which made 
my country free. I will trust in my 
God and the United States of America." 
Intent. The provisions of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
whenever appropriate, continue to ap-
ply to members of the Armed Forces 
while prisoners of war. Upon repatri-
ation the conduct of prisoners wiII be 
I'xamim'o as to the circumstances of 
capture and through the period of de-
tention with oue regaro for the rights 
of the inoividual and consideration for 
the conditions of captivity. 
A member of the Armed Forces who 
becomes a prisoner of war has a con-
tinuing obligation to remain loyal to 
his country, his service, and his unit. 
The life of a prisoner of war is hard. 
He must never give up hope; he must 
resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners 
of war who stand firm and united 
against the enemy wiII aid one another 
in surviving this ordea1.18 
The en.emy will respect an indivioual 
only as far as he respects himself. Pea!'c 
of mind and degrce of success wiII he 
directly proportional to the strength of 
moral principles. The POW must es-
tablish the level of his moral intcgrity 
in the eyes of his captors. In doing so 
it may be of a small consequence, but 
he will have won respect for himself, 
his service, and his country. A funda-
mental requirement of simple virtue 
which provides a firm foundation for 
patriotism and may become the fount 
of courage is: "A man has honor if he 
holds himself to a course of conduct, 
because of a conviction that it is in the 
general interest, even though he is well 
aware that it may lead to inconven-
i.ence, personal" loss, humiliation or 
grave physical risk."19 
Thc Korean conflict cIcarly rewall'd 
that captured troops serve the Com-
munists as a powerf!ll instrument for 
furthering psychological warfare goals. 
The enemy attempted, with some suc-
cess, to use prisoners of war in Korea 
in an organizeo propaganda campaign 
to discrcdit the United Statcs and 
United Nations in the Far East. The 
seriousness of' this threat cannot be 
measured merely in terms of the num-
ber of troops likely to be takcn prison-
er, or even of the smaller number who 
would actually contribute significantly 
to enemy psychological warfare activi-
ties. In Communist hands all POW's 
are potential ioea-wcapons, ano the SIlC-
cessful exploitation of anyone man 
may damage a nation's cause.20 
The Committee. in drafting the Code, 
was working on 1111.' premise that in tIl!' 
future U.S. military personnel who fall 
into Communist control wiII be sub-
jected to similar intensive indoctrina-
tion of the so-called brainwashing cate-
gory and that more nceds to he done to 
pr<'pare soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines for such treatment.21 
III-THE CODE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law has been defined as 
thos!' rul<'s for int<'rnational conduct 
whi('h haV<' mcl gen(~ral ae("!'pl:UH:I~ 
among the community or nations.1 It 
r<,fleets and records those accommoda· 
tions which, over centurit's, states have 
found it in their interest to make. It 
rests upon the common consent of 
civilized communities. It is made up of 
precedents, judicial decisions, treaties, 
arbitrations, international conventions, 
the opinions of learned writers in the 
firld. and a host of other acts which 
reprrsrnt in the aggrrgate those rules 
whieh enlightened nations and their 
propl!' arcrpt as hring llppropriatr to 
gO\"l'rn inll'rnalional conduct. 
That IlwTl' is sueh a law or war as 
part of the law of the community of 
nations is rxpressly statcd by the Nur-
emberg Tribunal in its judgment in the 
rollowing passage: 
The very essence of the London 
Ar;reement of Aur;ust 1945 is that 
im.li\'iduals ha\'!! international duties 
whir-h transcend the national ohliga-
tions of ohedience imposed by the 
individual state. He who violates the 
laws of war cannot obtain immunity 
while acting in pursuance of the au-
thority of the state if the state in au-
thorizing action moves outside its 
competence under international law.2 
We, as citizens of a democracy, do 
not need to be reminded that no law 
is better than the people who make it. 
Our own legal code is the expression of 
our social consciousness and the out-
growth of an enlightened and aroused 
public opinion. The body of intrrna-
tional law relating to the victims of 
war is the expression of a code of social 
justice on which people of many differ-
ent races, tongues, and political beliefs 
have agreed in the name of their com-
mon humanity. 
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During the ancient period of history, 
prisoners of war could be killed. and 
they were yer.y often at once actually 
butchered or offered as sacrificrs 10 the 
gods.3 If they were spared they were, 
as a rule, made slaves, but belligerents 
also on occasion exchanged their pris-
onrrs or lihrratcd tlwlll for ransom. 
This procedure continued through the 
Middle Ages, but under the influence 
of Christianity a prisoner's fate was 
mitigated, and by the time modern in-
ternational law gradually came into ex-
istence killing and enslaving prisoners 
of war had all but disappeared. 
The rules of international law have 
undrrgone a considerahle developllleilt 
silll'l' thr middle of th!' 17th crntury. 
AI Ihat time the law. as mentionl'd 
ahove. did little more than forbid thl' 
!'nsllln'mt'ni llnd indisrriminate killing 
of eaptiws. In l'omparison wilh tIll' 
slall' of 11\(':;:(' rull's. IIH' l'uslomary law 
of Ihl' 20th el'ntury Sl'l'mS to involve II 
cOn1pl!'x llnd compn'h!'nsiv!' body of 
rights and duties for any state which 
engages in war. 
Today, as we speak of international 
law, those of us in the military tend 
to Ihink principally of the Hague and 
G('neva Conventions. It should be noted 
and understood, however, that a dis-
tinction is made between Geneva Law 
and the Hague Law, resulting from the 
two Peace Conferences held in that city 
in 1899 and 1907, which codifies the 
rules of war in all matters outside the 
scope of the Geneva Conventions. The 
Hague Law relates in particular to 
the choice of weapons and of warfare.4 
Though both the Geneva and Hague 
Laws are based on humanitarian prin-
cipll's and aim llL Tl'straining viol!'ncl\ 
the Geneva Conventions more especial-
ly concern the protection of the indi-
vidual against the abuse of force, while 
the Hague Conventions enforce inter-
state rules on its actual employment. 
Further improvement of humanitar-
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ian treatmt'nt of prisoners of war oc-
r.urred during the War of Secession 
when the American Government pro-
mulgated in 186/1, Gertain humane regu-
lations drawn up hy the legal expert 
Lieber. The "Lieber Laws," as they 
were called, laid down that prisoners 
of war, as hdliger('l\ts, arc prisoners of 
the Government and not of the captor. 
They moreover stipulated that prison-
ers of war shall be given good food in 
abundance, as far as possible, and shall 
be treated humanely.5 It was logical 
then that the protection which the Gen-
eva Conventions of 22 August IBM 
had just conft'rred on the wounded and 
sick of tht' Armed Forct's in the fierd 
was also made applicable to prisoners 
of war. 
It was in keeping with these idt'as 
that the prisoner-oF-war qm'stion was 
rai~l'd at The IIagm' in 1899 at the 
Fir~1 Peace COllfl'n'llcl'. allll all inll'r-
national convention of this subject was 
I'stahlisheq for the first time. This con-
vention was then amended following 
World War I to hecome the Geneva 
Convention of 27 July 1929 establish-
ing the status of prisoners of war.1l 
As a f('sult of the experit'nce of the 
Second World War, this convention 
was revised to ht'come the Third Gen· 
eva Convention of 12 August 1949. 
This Conycntion contains 14R articles, 
hesidt's the annt'xes, as compared to 
97 arlicles in the corresponding 1929 
Convention and only 17 in the ('hapter 
on prisoners of war in tht' Hague Con-
vention.7 This incf('asl' is no doubt due 
to the fact that in modern warfare pris-
oners are ht'ld in larger numhers, hut it 
also characterizes the desire of the 1949 
Convention, represrnting all nations, to 
suhmit all a~prcts of captivity to hu-
mane rf'gulations of international law. 
One of the rssential difficulties in any 
drort to ameliorate thl~ conditions o[ 
prisoners of war is the nec('ssity of 
reconciling military and political inter-
ests with purely humanitarian ideas.!; 
It appears, however, that some progress 
was made toward this t'nd as the 19th 
century saw new concepts of natural 
law and a ncw humanitarian move-
ment. The civilizrd world finally ac-
cepted the fact that the prisoner of war 
was not a criminal hut merely an rnr-
my no longl'r ahle to hrar arms who 
should hr liberated at the dose of the 
hostilities and he respected and hu-
manely treated while in captivity. Far-
seeing and broadmindrd legal and dip-
lomatic action has since translated con-
crpt into practice through a series of 
codi fications a('crptrc\ as binding by 
statrs and successively extended or 
amplifird when experirnce showed 
tlll'm to he inadrquate. Thf' Brussrls 
Draft of 18(.1., the Hague Conventions 
of 1899 and ]1)07. 1111' spr('ial agrrl'-
n1l'lIts mac\1' IlI'lwf'1'1I 1l('lIil!l'renls ill 
HI'rIlI' in 1917 alld 11)1 It allli Ihl' (;1'11-
I'ya COllycntions of 1929. whieh dryoll-
all or par! of their dallsl's to prisoners 
or war, reprl'sent the principal stages of 
eyolution. 
The third Geneva Conference was 
('onv('ned by the Swiss Federal Council 
at Geneva and deliberated from 21 
April to 12 August 1949 for the pur-
pOSI' of revisin/!, amon:r others, the 
Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 
rriative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War. Thl' Conrerence established the 
tl'xts of four Conventions of which the 
thircl ConYl'nlion. "Grneva Convrntion 
HclaLiw To The Trl'atmrnt of Prison-
I'rS or \Var," is applicahle to this paprr. 
These Com'l'ntions, the text of which 
has heen established in the English and 
French languages, arc attached to the 
prt'sl'nt act. The original and the docu-
nll'nls accompanying it were deposited 
in Ihr archives of the Swiss Confedera-
tion.!) 
Thr Geneva Conventions of 1949 
apply to all casrs of declared war or 
any other armed conflict which may 
arise hetween two or more of the par-
ties to the Convention, evrn if the state 
of war is not recognized hy thrm.l0 
Mt'mhers of Ihe U.S. Armed Forces 
who fall into the power of the enemy 
in the' course of a war are declared 
prisoners of war and arc entitled to the 
prot<·(·tion accordt'd hy thl' Convention. 
It !'hould hr noted at this timc that 
none of thr major parties of the Korean 
war (United States, Communist China, 
Norlh. and South Korea) had ratified 
the Convention at the outbreak of the 
war. All announced an intention to ad-
hrr(' to it, however, and the North 
Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Pak Hun Yong, sent a message to the' 
S('crrtary General of the United Na-
tion!' on 13 July 1950 in which he 
statl'd that his country agreed' to ahide 
hy Ihe 1929 and 1949 Gl'JWVa Convrn-
I i()n~.ll 
TIll' ilia jo\" pa rl h·i pa 1\ I~ ha \"l' rn I i fil'd 
Iht' Con\"('nlion of 1919 and thus arc 
parlies 10 it as arc Norlh and South 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, 
and Sovirt Russia.12 
Thr remaining portion of this chap-
ter wiII consider the Code of Conduct ' 
for the Armed Forces in view of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and at-
tempt to determine their compatibility 
and to note any areas of conflict which 
might prove harmful to a, prisoner of 
war, both from the standpoint of sur-
vival and from a legal point of view. 
Article I and VI of the Code of 
Conduct are important in that they 
emphasize that the American soldier is 
a fighting man responsible for his ac-
tions and dedicated to guarding his 
country a~d to the principl('s and way 
of life for which his country stands. 
This indicates, first, the military per-
sonnel to whom the Code appli('s and, 
secondly, that they are accountable for 
failure to adhere to the Code. 
The Code's charge to members of the 
Armed Forces of the United States that 
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they arc responsible for their actions 
and the clear warning contained in 
D~partment of Defense Directive 
1300.7 of 8 July 1964 (that the pro-
visions of the Uniform Code of Mililary 
Justice apply at all times) arc not 
compatible with the declaration of the 
Grn('va COllvl'nl ion Ihat prisoJll!rs of 
war arc subject to the laws, regula-
tions, and orders of the detaining pow-
I'r while in captivity. 
Although the legislation of the Dc-
taining Power is applicable to him 
durinp: his captivity, he remains suh· 
jel·t to the military laws of his State 
of orip:ill. a~ a IIll'lIlbl'r of its armed 
.fon'e". He may thC'f(,fore he made 
an~wl'rahle bl"fore the courts of his 
country for his acts, and cannot plead 
in defense that national lep:islation is 
inapplicahle hecause it is suspended 
hy Article 82.13 
Thi" wa" hortH' oul whrn thl' Army 
Board of Ht'vit'w in Ihl' Batdwln\" I'a"t' 
(19 C.i\I.H. ,152 of 1%5) n'jl'Cll't! 11ll' 
at'cuspd's aq.HlIlH'nt Ihat till' GpJl(',-a 
Convention Relativ(' 10 the Trralml'nl 
of Prisoners of War (1929) placed all 
authority over POW's in the captor 
power and withdrew such power from 
the United States so that a general 
court-martial is without jurisdiction to 
try a repatriated POW for POW camp 
misconduct. The Board 'noted that the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 were also 
adopted for application by the oppos-
ing forces in the Korean war, but this 
did not alter its rejection of the asserted 
defense.14 
The Geneva Convention does not 
contain any provision attempting to 
prohibit a party to the conflict from 
applying its domestic law to a repatri-
atrd prisoner of war for misconduct 
during captivity. It is simply that in 
the prison camp only the discipline of 
the detaining power may be enforced, 
while domestic law enforcement of the 
prisoner's country must await his re-
turn to its control. It is not the duty 
of the detaining power to enforce the 
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laws of the nation of its prisoners. They 
must he self-enforced. 
Article II of the Code of Conduct 
will not be considered in the light of 
Convcntion compatihility in that it docs 
not concern prisoners of war but re-
Jat!'!' to !'Ilrrcnder. 
Arlidl' ITI of Ilw Co(Je (]('al:; wilh 
Ihn'(' important aspects of a prisoner's 
detainment - resistance, escape, and 
parolc - and cach will be discussed 
separately. 
Resistance. Mental and moral re-
:::istancl' to thl' dctaininl! powcr's I'/Torts 
to "brainwash," indoctrinate_ and dl'-
moralize in order to win converts, ob-
tain intelligence, or exploit the prison-
ers of war for propaganda purposes is 
n('Cl'ssary and cNtainly dol'S not con-
iiiI'! wilh Ih,' purpo:,,' or inll'nt of till' 
C,·n,'\·:\ Con\'l'ntillll. 110wl'\',·I". Ihl' pro· 
\'isioll of the Cod,' to "ri.'sist by all 
1II1'1\IIS availablp" rl'quircs Amcrican 
pri:'olll'rs of war to extend the battle-
ficld into thc prison camp and ddeat 
the captors, not only mentally but phys-
ically, e\'en in captivity. This require-
ment spems to connict with the spirit 
and purpose of the Convention. 
Article 13 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1919 states in part "that prisoners 
of war must at all times be humanely 
treated."!:; With regard to the concept 
of humanity, the purpose of the Con-
vention is none other than to define 
thl' correct way to behave toward a Im-
man being; each individual is desirous 
of the treatment corresponding to his 
status and can therefore judge how he 
should, in turn, treat his fellow human 
beings. It does not sel'm consistent for 
a country which has signed and ratified 
a treaty providing for the humane 
treatment of its military personnel who 
may hecome prisoners of war to pro-
mulgate subsequent instructions to its 
military personnel that. while expect-
ing humane trl'atment from their cap-
tors, they must convNt the prisoncr-of-
war camp into a battlefield. This action 
could, if carried to extremes. diminish 
or eliminate completely the prospects of 
humane treatment contemplated hy the 
Convention. As quoted in part from the 
U.S. Department of the Army, Pam-
phlet No. 27-161-2, 2 International 
Law 93-95 (1962), p. 95, par. E.: 
A new and disturbing aspect of the 
handling of prisoners of war was en-
countered in that the Communist 
soldiers, even after capturt', continued 
by intrigue and open violence to light 
against their captors. International 
law, as represented hy the 1949 
Geneva Convention, did not contem-
plate an openly ho~tilc contt'~t be-
tween the captor and the raptive. If 
such practice should continue in 
future wars. many of the humanitarian 
provisions of the 1949 Conn'ntion 
would hl'l"OIlH' diffil'ult to implcml'nt. 
Escape. Escape, in international law, 
is the state of a prisoner's havjng 
placed himself beyond the- immediate 
control of the public authorities of the 
previously detaining state without their 
consent. This status is terminated by 
recapture or death or by leaving the 
territory occupied by the enemy, at 
which time the escape becomes suc-
cessful.! 6 
The requirement that an American 
serviceman make cvery effort to I'scape 
if captured is an accepted military tra-
dition, neithcr contrary to military 
honor nor to moral law and is even 
regarded ag the accomplishment of a 
patriotic duty. Therefore, its inclusion 
in the Code of Conduct is highly ap-
propriate. The game application to 
medical personnel and chaplains, how-
('ver, conflicts with the gpecia\ status 
accorded them under Article 33 of thc 
1949 Geneva Convention, which in part 
says: 
Members of the medical personnel 
and chaplains while retained by the 
detaining power with a view to as· 
sisting prisoners of war, shall not he 
considered as prisoners of war. They 
5hall, howcver, rcreive as a minimum, 
the henefits and protection of the 
present Comention, and shall also be 
granted all facilities necessary to pro· 
vide for the medical care of, and reo 
lil!iou5 ministration to prisoncr!'> of 
war. 
The only reason for retention of 
suC'h prrsolllH'1 is to utilizr'thrir medi· 
cal and religious services in the care of 
the physical and religious needs of the 
priSOIH'rS of war. It is inconsistent and 
improper for this country to agree that 
such personnel may be retained in 
order that their professional services 
may hr utilized for the benefit of the 
prisoners of war and then require them 
10 makr e\'ery efIort to rscapr and thus 
"drsert" Ihose who need them. 
With the exception of the application 
of Ihe rscape rf'quirement to medical 
11I'r:;01llH'1 and chaplains as nolf'd ahoV(', 
IIH' n·(Jltin·nwnl Ihal Anwril'nn :;pl"\'il'l' 
1 II' r:;o 1II 11'1 lIIak(, (,\'l'ry l'lTort III ('~('apl' 
anel aiel olhers 10 ('scapf' is compatihle 
with Ihe Geneva Convention.' 
Parole. Article 21 (2) of the Con· 
wntion provides: "Prisoners of war 
may Iw partiaH)' or whoHy rcleasf'C1 on 
parole or promise, insofar as is aHoweo 
hy the laws of the Powcr on which they 
depend. Such measure shaH be taken 
particularly in cases where this may 
contrihute to the improvement of their 
state of health. No prisoner of war shaH 
he compl'Hed to accept liberty on parole 
or promise." Articlt' 21 (3) provides: 
"Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each 
Party to the connict shaH notify the 
ad\'l'TSl' Parly of the laws and regula. 
tions aHowing or forbidding its own 
national to accept liberty on parole or 
promise."17 
J n essence, the prisoner himself 
should know and understand whether 
or not his own cOllntry approves or dis· 
approves of his accepting parole. If he 
docs not, then the detaining power may 
not offer release on parole to a prisoner 
359 
if the laws and regulations of the power 
on which he depends forhid him to ac· 
cept. Such is the case of the American 
s('n'ic~man, as stated in the Code of 
Conduct. 
There is no direct conllict between 
the Code's prohibition of acceptance of 
parole and spccial favors ano thc ] 91.9 
Gt'IIl'va Convention. As previou:;ly 
noted, the parolt' laws of the power in 
whosc service the prisoner of war was 
at the time of capture must be oh· 
served by the detaining power. 
Hence, while no direct conflict exists 
bt'twecn the Code and the provisions of 
the Convenlion on the point of no 
parole, it 001'5 s('t'm to connict with the 
spirit allo purpose of the provisions for 
retaining medical personnel and chap. 
lains in that they may he IHl'vt'nted 
from fuH}' performing in some situa· 
lions whf'f('. wilhoul parolf', tIl!' ('amp 
('ommander would not Iwrmit Ilwm 10 
lean' Iht' ('amp to minister to pri!'olll'r:; 
of war in olhf'r hospitals. camp~. and 
labor detachments and in the CUSf' of 
sick or woundf'd prisoners when, as the 
Convention stipulatf's, "it may contri-
bute to the imp~ovement of tllf'ir state 
of health." 
Article IV of the Code of Conduct 
of'als with the areas - keep faith, take 
command and obey lawful orders. 
Keep Faith. There does not seem 
to he any conflict hetween the Code's 
rt'quirement that American prisoners 
of war keep faith with each othl'r and 
nl'ither do nor say anything harmful to 
f'ueh other and thf' provisions of the 
191-9 Geneva Convention. 
Take Command. Article 79 of the 
Geneva Convention provides for recog· 
nition or election of a Prisoner of War 
Representative in all places where there 
af(~ POW's. In officer camps and in 
mixed camps (officers and other ranks) 
the sl'nior officer wilJ he recognized as 
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thC' POW Representative; in nonofficer 
camps the prisoners shall elect by secret 
ballot a POW Representative every 6 
months from among themselves. An 
officer will he stationed in each lahor 
camp for the purpose of carrying out 
the camp administration duties for 
which tlH' POW's an' rC'sponsihl('. Tlw 
POW's in the labor eamps llIay dect 
th(' officer as their POW ReprC'scntative 
hut are not requircd to do SO.18 
Thcre appears to ('xist some conflict 
hetween the Code and the Geneva Con-
vention in situations wherehy in non-
officer and lahor camps the same pris-
oner of war may occupy the two posi-
tions of POW Heprcsentative and Sm-
ior in Command. In officer and mixed 
camps the two positions will be occu-
pi£'d hy the same individual. 
TIIP prohh'lll whieh ('ould ('xist in Ihe 
fortl1l'r sitllalion. and do('s ('xisl in th(' 
lall!'r. oC(,lIrs wll('l1 IInch'r IllI' Code all(\ 
ils illl)llc'Jl1('ntin~ regulations his com· 
manel r('sponsihilitil's - enforCl.'Ill£'nt of 
01(' Code and the duty to defeat till' 
enemy - are paramount at all times; 
yet, under the Geneva Convention his 
responsibility to furthpr the welfare of 
his fellow prisoners of war is para-
mount. Which duty shall prevail? In 
that the President of the United States, 
who promulgated the Code of Conduct, 
is limited in his "ordinance-making" 
power by the restriction that his rules 
and regulations must not contravene a 
statule nC'at£'d by Congr£'ss or the pro-
visions of the Constitution. IhC' TrC'aty 
(G£'neva Convention) must take prpce-
d('I1('('. The PrC'sident's ExC'culiVt' Orc)('r 
is suhordinate to the Geneva Conven-
tion requirpments wh£'n there is a con-
flict.)!! 
In th£'ir r£'gulations impl£'menting 
til£' Code of Conduct and describing 
the nature of the training which should 
he givt'n military personnel in the 
Code, hoth the Secr£'taries of Defmse 
and Army hav£' indicated that the 
elected POW Representative system as 
providN) for in ArticlC's 79·81 of the 
Convention would he formed only if 
the Senior in Command organization 
(under Article IV, Code of Condlwt) 
cannot he effected. This is in conflict 
with the G£'n£'va Convention. Perhaps 
it is intend£'d by the Departm£'ut of l)£,-
f£'nse to impose a dllty on military per-
sonnel to elect the senior POW as the 
POW Repn·sentative in nonofficer 
camps, since in officer and mixed camps 
the senior officer will he the POW Rep-
resentative in accordance with Article 
78 of the Con\'ention. If this is the 
case it would seem to conflict with the 
r£'quirement for a free, secret election 
requireo hy Article 79 (1) of the 
Geneva Convention. 
Obey Lawful Orders. There oo£'s 
not se(,1ll to II(' ('onfliet 11('1\\'£'('Jl the' 
Codl' and til(' C('n£'\';\ Convention on the 
point of olwdi£'lIe(' to orders. Th£'rt, is 
110 nl£'ans for the liC'l)ior to punh:h 
pri~onerli of war who' rduse to obey his 
lawrul orders; punishment, if appropri-
atl'. must await repatriation. 
Article V of tbe Code of Con-
duct. Article 17 of the Geneva Con-
v£'ntion requires that, when questioned, 
every prisoner of war must give only 
his name. rank, service number, and 
date of hirth; or failing that, equivalent 
information. No physical or mental 
torture or any other form of coercion 
may lIe u!'Oed against th£' POW's to se-
CIII"I' from tIwlll any additional infor-
Illation. 
Article 70 of the Convention requires 
that every prisoner of war be per-
mitt£'d, immediatdy upon capture or at 
l£'ast within 1 week after arrival at 
the POW camp, to send a Capture 
Card to his family and to the Central 
Prisoner of War Agency. The suggested 
form of the Capture Card is prescribed 
in Annex IV to the' Convention and 
provides for giving 13 items of infor-
mation: name, power on which the 
POW drprnds, first name of father, 
datr of hirth, place of birth,. rank, 
service numher, address of next. of kin, 
when taken prisoner, health status, 
prrsent address, and date. Prisoners of 
war may, if they so choos(', complete 
only the name, rank, service number, 
and date of birth portion of the card. 
Beyond name, rank, service number, 
and date of hirth, the prisoners go on 
at risk of future court-martial upon re-
patriation. The words, "to the utmost 
of my ability," indicate the limit to 
which he must go before he may avoid 
criminal liahility for giving informa-
tion helpful to the enemy. He will have 
10 show that any harmful or useful in-
formation he gave, allegedly involun-
tarily_ was caused hy a well-grounded 
app,'('hmsion of immrdial(' and im-
pl',\(lin~ (It'alh or of imnH'diah" sl'rious. 
hotlily harm in order to dl'fend success-
fully his actions on the ground of coer-
cion or duress. 
There is nothing in the Geneva Con-
wntion drsigned to promote disloyalty 
among the prisoners of war or to re-
quire a prisoner to hr disloyal to the 
country in whose armed forces he was 
serving at the time of capture. 
The requirements of the Code that 
answers to questions put to a prisoner 
by the detaining power must be limited 
to name, rank, service number, and 
date of hirth, that the POW must evade 
answering furth('r qurstions to the ut-
most of his ability, and that the POW 
must not make oral or writtrn state-
ments disloyal or harmful to his coun-
try, its allies, or his comrades need not 
conflict with the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention. 
Some conflict may arise from the ap-
plication of the Code restraints to usc 
oC the Capture Card and personal cor-
r('spondence of the captive to the out-
side. Conflict may arise from omission 
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of clarifying remarks specifically ex-
cmpting the Capture Card from Article 
V restrictions or permitting its partial 
completion and failure to discuss per-
sonal correspondence. When restricted 
to the four permissible items of name, 
rank, service number, and date of birth, 
the POW is in effect denied use of the 
Capture Card-for he must address it fQr 
mailing. 
A similar conflict arises concerning 
the private correspondence the POW 
is privileged to engage in under Ar-
ticle 71 of the Convention. Such cor-
respondenc(' is subject to censorship by . 
the detaining powl'r, thus providing the 
enemy with names and addrrss('s of 
family and friends, personal informa-
tion, etc. Neither the Code itself nor 
tIll' Department of De£l'ns(' and individ-
ual S('rvicI' Instructions promulgating 
Ihl' Codl' provide ~uidance in this arl'a, 
TIll' I'on/lict~ I1l'tw('rll thr Cod!' of 
Conduct and thl' Gl'nrYa Conwlltion of 
1949 which hav(' hr('n discussl'd aris(' 
('ssentially from the humanitarian pur-
pose of the Convention and the assump-
tion therein that the prisoner of war is 
no longer a danger to the enemy be-
cause he is removed from the fight, and 
the directly contrary instructions con-
tained in the Department of Defense 
Directive 1300.7 of 8 July 1964 im-
plementing the Code that directs the 
American soldier to continue the battle 
in the prisoner-of-war camp and physi-
cally defeat the enemy even there. The 
Code of Conduct need not be and 
should not be interpreted in a manner 
inconsistent with the Geneva Conven-
tion. as is stated in JAGW 1961/1140, 
23 June 1961: "It was not intended 
that the Code of Conduct contravene 
thl' provisions of the Geneva Conv('l1-
tions." The conflicts, such as they are, 
can he r('movcd easily by issuing cer-
tain qualifications to a few absolute 
instructions contained in the imple-
menting departmental regulations. 
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IV -THE CODE AND 
THE MAN 
It has been said that "the misconduct 
of a minority in Korea, made it neces-
sary to set down in specific words a 
Code of Conduct which had ther!'tofore 
l)('{'n traditional with mosL Unit<·d 
States military men."l Many of the 
lesser failures of Ame-rican captives 
oc-curred I)('e-ause they didn't know 
what was really e-xpected of them in the 
prison camp environment. To face the 
enemy on the hattIe field was one thing, 
hut to meet him face to face in an in-
terrogation room was something else. 
The Korean war had three aspects. 
The-re was the civil war aspect - North 
Koreans fighting South Koreans for 
('ontrol of a divided country. Then' 
was the collcctive- a~pe-ct - t'J(' fir"t 
lilliit'd Nations attempt to ;top a 
treaty-hreaking aggm::sor. And finally, 
th{'re was the cold war aspect - the 
West!'rn Powers blocking the expan-
sion of Communist imperialism.!! This 
was the first war in whie-h America as 
a whole met its enemy - totalitarian 
communism. For it was not just young 
soldiers who faced the antagonist. but 
the entire cultural pattern from which 
th!'y had come. 
The causes of the war, United Na-
tions objectives, and the need for 
American response were not clearly 
delineated in the public mind. This lack 
of under"tanding prevailed among the 
civilian populace as well as within mili-
tary ranks. It might hr that tllC're 
existed a Be-cd for better coordination 
between the military, civilian educa-
tional institutions, churches, and patri-
otic organizations to provid!' U.S. se-rv· 
ice personnel with a better understand-
ing of the American ideals. The young 
man who, upon entry into the mTlitary 
service, has not been taught pride in 
country and self and a sense of honor 
and duty must be accepted on those 
terms. The man cannot be completely 
made over, even if the services had the 
time. 
As everyone knows, 21 of the Amt'ri-
cans captured during the Korean war 
decided to remain with the enemy -
the only time in history that American 
captives have chosen not to return 
home because they preferred the ene-
my's form of government to their own.3 
This action, of course, was all the more 
astonishing because the enemy's form 
of government was so unlike our own. 
Could it have hcen that they really 
didn't know enough about their own 
government? Possibly somewhere in 
the past someone failed them by not 
adequately instilling within them that 
pride of country for which, in the past, 
so many have died. 
TIl<' Code of Conduct's high stand-
ards we-re- ~et forth as guides for 
Americans in uniform. Backed by adl~­
quate training and education, they are 
to support the assurance of Armed 
Forc{'s leade-rs that American fighting 
Jllen will Ill' fully pr;'pared to meet the 
ene-my on any front and under any con-
ditions. 
In Korea tIl(' United State-s hac1 fin-
i~IJ('d a war with an l'lll'my who fought 
not only on the- hattlefie-id hut in prison 
e-amps as well hy manipulating the 
minds of the prisoners. The U.S. Gov-
{'mme-nt and military establishment 
had come to sec that U.S. servitx'me-n 
not only had to be trained how to fight 
phy"ically, hut they had to know how 
to fight back me-ntally lind morally M 
well. 
The Communists looked upon a pris: 
on('r in their hands as slave lahor and 
as a tool of propaganda warfare-.4 One 
ve"rification is the following, which was 
presented hy William E. Mayer, a U.S. 
Army psychiatrist, in a spe('ch repro-
duced by Baylor Univ('rsity, Waco, 
Texas, in 1957. The document, ohviolls~ 
Iy communistic, is not presented here 
as an endorsement but merely for con-
sideration and the fact that it contrib-
utes to the understanding of the ap" 
proaches that thr. Communists used in 
thl'i'r handling of the Amerie~m prison-
ers in Korea. It comes from a message: 
writtl'n hy the Chil'f of Intl'IJigl'nce: of 
the Chil1l'sl' PI'oples Volunteers in 
North Korea to Chief of Intelligence: of 
Chinese Peoples Republic in Peiping, 
and the message - the original one 
that was intercepted was entitled, "An 
EvallJation of the American Soldiers"-
litr.rally translated, rl'ads as follows: 
Based IIpon our observations of the 
American soldiers and their officers 
captured in this war for the liberation 
of Korea from the capitalist-impe· 
rialist aggression, some facts arc evi· 
dlmt. The American soldier has weak 
loyalties - to his family, his com-
munity, his country, his religion, and 
to his f('lIow ~oldil'r. J1i~ ('onccpt of 
right nud wronl! is hn7.Y. III! is hnsicn!-
ly materialistic, and he is an op· 
portunist. By himself he feels inse-
cure and frightened. He underesti-
mates his own work and his strength 
and his ability to survive. lIe is ig-
norant of social values, social con-
flicts, and tensions. There is little or 
no knowledge or understanding even 
among American university graduates 
of U.S, political history and philoso-
phy; the federal, state, and com-
munity organization; states and civil 
rights, freedom safeguards; and how 
thcse allegedly operate within his own 
decndent system. 
He is exceedingly insular and pro-
vincia! with little or no idea of the 
problems and the aims of what he 
contemptuously describes as foreigners 
and their countries, He has an un-
realistic concept of America's external 
and inherent, rather than earned or 
proved, superiority and absolute mili-
tary invinl'ibility. He fails to appre-
riate the meaning of nnd the nece~­
~ity for military orgnnization or any 
form of discipline. ]\[ost often he 
appears to feel that his military serv-
ice is a hateful, unavoidable servi-
tude to be tolerated as briefly as 
possible and then escaped from as 
rapidly as possible or he is whnt they 
themselves call a "peacl'lime soldier" 
who sees it only as a soft and a safe 
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joh. Both of those types resent hard-
ship and sacrifice of any description 
as if these things were unreasonable 
and unfair to them personally. 
Based upon the above facts about 
the imperialist United States agl!res-
sors, the re('ducatiQn and indoctrina-
tion program for American prisoners 
proceeds as planned.s 
This was'the enemy we were fighting 
in Korea; this is the enemy we are 
fighting in Southeast Asia; and this, 
in all probahility, will he our enemy in 
future conflicts. It is a truism that no 
nation can expect to survive unless it 
knows the nature of its enemy and 
unless it maintains both the moral and 
physical strength to defend itsdf 
against him. We know our Communist 
enemy and we will not be caught short. 
A nation cannot guarantee survival 
10 Jllel11lll'rs of IH'r Arllll'cl Forl't's, l'illH'r 
in ('ol11hal or I'aplidly, anti Anll'ril':1II 
fi~hlin!! IlIl'n clon'l :Isk fM slll'h a 1!1I:tr-
antee - Ihey ask only for a fightin/! 
chanre. The Armed Forces Codl' of 
Conduct was written for men of con-
science: and good faith - to help give 
tlwm that fighting chance.G 
Secretary' Wilson's Advisory Com-
mittee on Prisoners of War, drafters of 
the Code, unanimously agreed that the 
military services should institute a two, 
fold training program to insure its 
maximum dissemination and to assist 
in preparing our fighting men for any 
contingency.7 The President of the 
United States contributed further when 
he stated in promulgating the Code of 
Conduct: 
No American prisoner of war will 
be forgotten by the United States. 
Every availahle m!'ans will be em-
ployed by our Con'mlllent to !'stnblish 
I'onta('t with, to ~upport and to obtain 
the re!casl! of all our prisoncrs of 
war. Furthermore, the laws of the 
United States provide for the support 
and care of dept'ndents of members 
of the armed for('cs induding those 
who become prisoners of war. I as-
sure dependents of su('h prisoners 
that these laws will continue to pro-
vide for their welfare,S 
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Thus we have scm evidence that in-
doctrination and training in the Code 
of Conduct for all military personnel 
is considered an important and valu-
ahle phasl". The Committee madc such 
'a recommendation to the President, 
who in tllrn ill his Ex('clltivl' Ord(')' 
stakd in part, 
. . . that every member of the 
Armf'd Forces is expected to ml'asurc 
up to the standards ('mhodied in the 
Code and that in order to achieve 
these standards, each mcmher of the 
Armed Forces liable to capture 
should he provided with specific train-
in/! and instructions designed to hetter 
equip him to counter and undl'rsland 
all enemy efforts against him, and 
should he fully instructed as to the 
Ilt'havior and ohli/!ations expected of 
him durin/! com hat or captivity.9 
TI\(' S('CTl'tary of ndl'n~l'. in lurn. 
pronllll)!ah'Ii a 1l11'1l1111'antl1ll1l Itl lIlt' 
~l'('rl'laril's of Ill<' ~lilila)'r \)1'\1:11'1-
1lI('nt~, duted 18 August 1955, to pro-
"ilil' Ihl'm wiLh further guidance. This 
memorandum was cancelled by DOD 
Dir{'ctivc No. 1300,7, dated 8 July 
1961·, which estahlishes current policies 
and proecdures and provides basic 
guidance for the development and exe-
cution of training, including instruc-
tional material, in furtherance of the 
aims and objectivl"s of the Code of 
Conduct for memhers of the Armed 
Forcl"s,10 Further, thc objectives of the 
Dirl'ctive were to insure that: 
A. The Military Departments main-
tain energctic, uniform, and continuing 
training programs in behalf of the 
Code of Conduct, including training 
when-hy individuals arc taught to re-
sist under the varying degrees of hos-
tilt> interrogation. 
B. All training programs in support 
of the Code of Conduct inculcate in 
each member of the Armed Forces: 
1. A clear and uniform understand-
ing of his ohligations, responsibilities, 
and thl' hehavior expected of him in 
comhat or captivity. 
2. A .positive and unswerving belief 
in and devotion to the spirit and letter 
of the Code of Conduct, and the 
recognition that the Code is a binding 
military obligation. 
3. An unqualified determination 
and helief in his ability to oppose and 
defl'at physi.cally, mentally, and moral-
ly all en {'my elIorts against him, his fel-
low servicemen, and his country during 
pl'acetime. ('omhat, or captivity. 
iI·. A confidence in his ability to 
deny information and to resist enemy 
interrogation, exploitation and indoc-
trination, 
C. Therc is a consistency in all De-
partillent of J)efens(' Code of CondlH,t 
training programs and training ma-
terials.]1 
lIpon r('('('ipt of this I!lIidane('. each 
of Ill<' military ":I'I'rl'laril''': Ihen pwnllll. 
:rUh'" in~ln\l'li(ln,.: 10 Ihl'ir 1'I':,p",'liw 
:'I'r\"i('!':'. It is my inh'nlion to ('m'l')' 
hri('Oy and in part. only'th(' Air Forc!' 
uncI the Navy uc,tion along with s('v('ral 
n-commendations provided for Army 
aviation personnel. In this manner full 
duplication will he avoided, yet some 
idea as to the practices and procedures 
of the R('rvices will be presented. 
Air Force. All commands instituted 
a three phase training plan to include 
at least 10 hours of training a year in 
support of the Code.12 All members 
re('{'ive a general hriefing on the Code 
and national policies under phase one 
which covers five.major areas: 
1. The Code and its purpose and 
meaning. 
2. Resistance to enemy political and 
economic indoctrination. This calls for 
training in. "basic truths and advan-
lage~ of our democratic institutions as 
opposed to the fallacies of commu-
nism." 
3. National, service, and unit his-
tories and traditions. 
tl .. Motivations of individuals toward 
national aims ~'as opposed to those of 
the enemy." 
5. Character guidance and encour-
agement of religious beliefs. 
Phase two, a more specific form of 
survival and prisoner indoctrination, is 
givl'n mainly to crewm('n vulncrahl(' to 
c:apture. It is patt('rned along the lin('s 
of the survival school at Stea!l AFB, 
Nevada, where fighting men get the 
unvarnisIwc1 truth ahout POW treat-
nWllt C rom those who kllow - the ex· 
POW's thems('lves.1:l The third phase 
of training is for specialized personnel 
and includes classified intelligence sub-
jects. 
Of the minimum 10 hours of annual 
Cooe training, 2 hours should he dedi-
cat('o to the Code itself, its purpose 
and meanin~, with other sessions de-
"oll'd 10 ollwr Sllhj('!'ls. 
Nm'y. Bun'all oC N:n'al Pl'r~llnJl(·1 
Inl'lrul,tion IGlO.9C of 22 S('ptelllh('r 
1961" /Jurrau. 0/ Naval Personnel Man-
ual. NAVPERS 15791A, revised 1959, 
ancl lIlIitcd Statrs Navy Regulatiolls. 
19'18 provide the current guidanc!', 
n·lativc to the Code of Conduct, for 
Ill!' naval service. 
The Rurean 0/ Naval Personnel Man-
ual statl'S in part that" ... thl' training 
and education program of each com-
mand shall in!'lude instruction in the 
Cooe of Conduct and shall he design!'<1 
10 presl'nt a clear realization to thc 
s!'rvicl'man that the full and loyal oh-
s('rvance of the spirit and letter of the 
Code is in the hest interest of the 
Nalion, the Naval Service, his ship-
maIl'S. and himself." 
For enlisted personnel, when the 
Cooe has b('en explained for the first 
tillll'. an appropriate l'ntry shall be 
made on the Administrative Remarks 
page of the Enlisted Service R('cord.14 
Navy Regulatiolls states in part that 
"thl' Codl' of Conduct shall be careful-
ly explaitwd to each Navy enlisted per-
son": 
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1. Within 6 days of his initial en-
listment. 
2. Aftcr completion of 6 months' ac-
tive service. 
3. Upon the occasion of each reen-
listment. 
Instruction in the Code shall he in-
ciud('d in th!' training and cducational 
program of the command, and a t('xt 
of the COOf' of Conduct shall he posted 
in a conspis;uous pIacl', or places, read-
ily accessible to the personnel of the. 
command.l5 
Bureau. 0/ Personnel Instruction 
1610.9C's purpose is to insure that 
training programs incorporat(' policies 
and pro'cedurl's for trainin~ in the 
Code of Conduct. Paraphrased. it statl's 
in part that !'ommandin:r officl'rs will 
prm'idl' ('duration and traininf!' in till' 
Codl' to ronform wilh p:uidat)('1' pro-
yidrd hy lilt' Ikparlnll'1l1 of ])('[('11:«'. 
Inslruction and nppliration of th(' Coo(' 
will \)(' ('ff('rtivelr illcillcl('d as an ill-
\('gral part of a Command Leadl'rship 
Training Program. That for technical 
training, two hours outside the normal 
work week shall be devoted to material 
presentation. During recruit training this 
instruction shall be given during normal 
instruction time.! 6 
The following recommendations are 
thos~ given to assist Army aviation per-
sonnel to withstand encroachmen.t of 
Communist psychology. They were 
madl' in November 1948, several 
months before the outbreak of hostili-
ti('s in Korea, and are based upon per-
sonal experiences of a field grade offi-
("l'r in a Japanl'se prisoner-of-war com-
Jlound and arc still considered valid,11 
1 n part, they are: 
1. POW survival should be studied 
just as thoroughly as arctic and jungle 
survival. 
2. Physical training of the combat 
troops should be greatly intensified -
the soldier should be at his best, men-
tally and physically, at time of capture. 
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3. The e-ducation and indoctrination 
program should give a true picture of 
the enemy's treatment of prisoners; "to 
b(' forewarned is to be forearmed." 
4. A study of the psychology of the 
l'lle-my's treatment of POW's should be 
k('pt up-to.date through all intellig(,llce 
~ollrce-s. 
5. Discipline of the mind, physical 
adaptahility, and flexihle- hehavior pat-
terns should he strongly stressed in 
training periods. 
6. Ex-POW's could assist in brief-
ings be-fore missions by presenting 
hdpful hints from personal experiences 
such as proper clothing, food, how to 
avoid breaking security, and impor-
tanc(' of a hobby. 
As a part of a r('sistance training 
prop.ram_ troops should he- tau~ht Ihe-
"l'l'l"ifil" way" in whil"h ;It'!" of p:ulil'i-
palion aid Ihe (,lll'IIlY'~ propaganciistic 
eaus(' and endange-r the s('curity of the 
United 'Stale-s. Enemy p~ychological 
warfan' laelics should Ill' undl'n,lood hy 
our soldiers in the context of the Com-
munists' hroad strate-p:y of exte-rnal 
warfar('. Finally, tl1<' POW should 1)(' 
taught th(' skills r('quin'd to activat(' 
and 0lwrale covert resistance organiza-
tions in int('rnnwnt and how to ('sea pc 
the captor and survive under difficult 
condi tions.lR 
v - COUNTERCHARGE 
In the years following the Ame-rican 
Revolution vast confusion of thought 
as to what was re-quired to in~ure the 
survival of the American way of life 
exist('d. Some argu('d that the military 
shoulrl he e-Iiminated altogether, while 
othc-rs such as Thomas Jeff('rson, one 
of the grc'at architerts of d('mocracy, 
warned: "\Ve must train and c1assi f y 
the whole of our male citizens and 
make military instruction a regular 
part of collegiate education. We can 
nev('r 1)(' safe until this is done."l 
The military way is a long, hard 
road r('qlliring the maximum from 
each individual - in tim('s of war the 
demands are even higher. If nothing 
hut fear of punishm('nt was dep('nded 
upon to hold me-n to the Iinr during 
cxtrrm(' trial, the r('suits in all proba-
bility would he wholesale mutiny ancI 
a situation well he-yolICI the conlrol of 
adequate and qualifiecIll'acIcrship. Srlr-
~aerifice and a ~uprrme devotion to 
dUly arl' II\(' prime ingreclirnts of thr 
d('clicat('d professional. 
Much controversy and much debat(' 
have been generat('cl regarding the con-
duct of the American fighting man in 
Korea. When the first prisoners of war 
were taken hy the Communist forers, 
ther imml'diatrly hecamr til(' suhjert 
of an intl'nsi\'e C:ommunist propaganda 
campaign. During thl' war itsrlf thl' 
I'ontro\'l'rsy inen'a"l'.! in inte-n,.:ity. un· 
IiI. ('wn t ually. prisO\\('r i":":I\('s hl'I'a III I' 
thl' profl'ssrd ":;tumhling hlorks" in th(' 
lonp:-drawn.out truce'talks, delaying its 
t('rmination.2 
Upon repatriation, the 4,4,28 Ameri-
cans who surviv('d the enemy prison 
camps he-cam(' thr suhjects of another 
type of propaganda - propaganda hy 
Aml'ricans, about Americans, directed 
to Amerieans.3 Reports were circulated, 
as has hren previously noted in this 
pape-r, that as many as one of seven 
American prisoners collaborated with 
till' rnemy, betrayed their buddies, 
signed self.incriminating statements or 
statrments that incriminated their 
Gov('rnment. The widespread publicity 
giV('n to r('ports of this nature and 
the wide dissemination of the view that 
the Korean events are conclusive d('m-
onstrations of social decay in Amcri· 
e-an socirty have not gone compl('tdy 
l1nehalI('ngl'd. It is intcnde-d that this 
chapt('r will pr('srnt a portion of those 
challenges as the challengers in turn 
make the-ir c·ol111terc:harg('. Tn doing so 
they farr no simple task, as those who 
attempted to correct disorted interpre-
tations of the events in Korea encoun-
trrrd a numher of grrat difficulties, 
particularly whrn they wished to do so 
within the format aIIowrd hy mass-
circulation media.4 No scholarly his-
tory of thr events of the Korean 
rpisode was preparrd: Government sP.-
('mity rl'gulations pT<W('nlf!el aeel'ss to 
Ilw hasic somees hy non-government 
sl'holars anel hy many within the 
~OVI'T11I11I'nt who are intefl'~ll'd hut diel 
not POSSl'SS a "nerd to know." 
An examination will be made of the 
grnrral characteristics of those who 
wrrr classified upon repatriation as 
rither resistors, collaborators or mid-
dle groun(l personnel in an attempt to 
elisrovrr a common denominator. Fi-
nally. Ih(' idras of some as to why. our 
pl'r~(l1ln('1 in C:ommunist prison enmps 
lwrrllrtlll'll :1:< tlll'Y lli,1 will Ill' "i,'w"d 
in a l'nn:<lrm'liw alii! "xlt'nllalin~ m:\Il-
Ill'r. 
Wrll ovrr a hundred separate scien-
lific studi('s of prisoner behavior in 
those camps have been conducted, and 
it ("an hr d('finitely stated that U.S. 
personnd in Korean prison camps be-
haved as well as military men have 
acted in any war in which this country 
has engaged - drspite the fact that 
they were subjected to treatment never 
experienced in any other war.5 Of the 
7,190 Americans taken prisoner over 
90 percent were taken during the first 
12 months of the conflict, and most of 
those remained until hostilities ceased 
about 3 y('ars later.G No on~ will deny 
that 3 years should be more than 
adequate to separate the men from the 
boys. By any yardstick, in the Korean 
struggle - the first armed clash with 
communism - U.S. prisoners were 
treated in a manner heretofore un-
known. More than a fifth of returnees 
were, in spite of the fattening period 
just prior to r('patriation, diagnosed as 
suffering from malnutrition. The aver-
age weight loss in captivity was 21 
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pounds, and some 257 of them had lost 
I{.O pounds or more.7 Malnutrition posed 
a greater threat than starvation. Most 
POW deaths were caused by lack of 
proteins, minerals_ or vitamins rather 
than hy caloric d('ficiencies.8 
Th(' first ordral a prisoner had to 
sufTl'r - and p('rhaps tlw worst - was 
the march from thr place of captur(' 
to one of the prison camps. The march-
ing prisoners were b('atrn and kickc·d. 
A numher of the North Korean offic('rl" 
w('re hullwhip harbarians: products of 
a semiprimitive rnvironment. On one 
of th(' so-callrd death marches, 700 
men were head('d north, hut bdor(' tlw 
camp was rpached 500 men had 
p(,rished.!l Upon arnvmg at till' 
prisoner-of-war camp the survivors 
\\'('r(' put through a starvation period 
(b:i~n('d 10 kill th(' w('ak and Iht' 
\\'oulllj('d. It i!'n't trill' Ihat Ill!' COI1\I1\U-
nist!' wanl to eonycrt IllI' wl'ak('!'t nl!'n, 
Th('y \\'ant only thosr of Ihe stron~('sl 
will. hrli('\'inp: thry will makr th(' 1)(':"'1 
Communists.10 
The Communist eapLors viewed the 
prisoner primarily as a rich source of 
potent propaganda material. By means 
of a h('avy barrage of indoctrination, 
th('y attempted to convert American 
prisoners of war Lo communism. This 
is horne out hy these Iacts: 97 percent 
of the r('turned POW's were subjected 
to enemy indoctrination during intern-
ment, and virtually all received some 
form of an indoctrination lecture; 83 
percent were required to attend group 
study periods; 43 percent attended 
smaller discussion groups and conferen-
crs while 27 pprcent attended public 
p:athrrings rallrd hy the captor.l1 The 
O\'('rriding theme stm;sed in indoctri-
nation was the social and economic 
m('rits of communism as against the 
"sins" of American capitalism. 
To carry out this program of POW 
exploitation the Communists used three 
major techniques:12 
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Rewards and Punishments - a sys-
tem which played upon the natural 
tendency to seek pleasures and avoid 
pain. 
Divide and Conquer - a system 
which denied the prisoners normal 
sources of leadership and encouraged 
divisiVl'lI(-sS and suspicion amon~ them. 
[d(-a EnvirolUllent - a strictly con-
trolled environment with no friendly 
news sources (radios, newspapers, let· 
ters) coupled with a heavy diet of 
Communist news. 
Interrogation was hoth verbal and 
writtl-n, with approximately GO percent 
hcinp: verhaJ.13 Autohiographies wen-
rl'quin-d and completed hy 91 percent 
of all the POW's in Korea. Thirty nine 
percent admitted signing propaganda 
petitiollS.H As one POW stated in part 
II1'0n n-palrialion: 
I dis,'o\"-f(-d how .. as\' it was to 
,'onu- out on the I05in~ (-I;d of a hatll!' 
of wits with till' interrogator. They 
had all the admntage5. plus being 
highly trained in the art of interroga· 
tion, and I had only heen' given a few 
hours training in how to resist ... I 
was reasonably sure my interrogator 
already knew the answers to most of 
the questions which I refused to an-
swer, but this was part of their tech· 
nique to further confuse and baffle 
me.IS 
This POW was forced to stand con· 
tinuously for 154 hours, more than 61h 
days, and was under interrogation for 
over 60 hours, having slept less than 1 
hour in almost a week.16 He had spent 
222 days in solitary confinement.17 
The real tragedy of the American 
prisoners in Korea who gave comfort 
to the enemy is not what they did 
under pressure hut the fact that they 
were totaIIy unprepared for that pres-
sure. The best prepared, frontline 
soldier is helpless unless he knows what 
he is fighting for. The most vulnerable 
prisoners lacked moral convictions and 
a sense of their own inherent dignity. 
They had gone to war without realizing 
the importance of the conflict and had 
marched off to prison without knowing 
they were still at war. An Air Force-
established hoard of general officers 
who reviewed the case of 83 officers and 
airmen who had made false confessions 
or who were accused of collaboration 
stated: "that the briefing and indoc· 
trination given U.S. combat personnel 
as to their conduct as prisoners of war 
was inadequate and confusing."1s 
Gen. John E. Hull, U.S. Army, 
(Ret.), commander of the forces in the 
Far East during the Korean war and 
an acting Chairman of the Defense 
Committee which wrote the Code, 
st.ated further: 
I feel strongly that we are derelict 
in our schools in teaching the youth 
of this nation enough ahout what we 
5tand for and what rommunism stands 
for. I have a very firm helief that the 
youth of this nation, if they fully 
understood the Communist system, 
would never question our system, But 
I do think that Communist soldiers 
are much more fully indoctrinated 
than ours are. The schools have a 
responsibility here. When an American 
youth enters the military service he 
should know what his country stands 
for. The services should not be called 
upon to teach it to him.19 
The Senate Permal1ent Investigating 
S\lbcommittee, which had been study-
ing Communist interrogation, indoctri-
nation, and exploitation of American 
military and civilian prisoners, stated 
that: "the military Services are to be 
criticized for not having fully adapted 
their training programs to prepare 
troops for the problems encountered in 
Chine:;e Communist prison eamps dur-
ing the Korean war."20 The Committee 
noted, however. that the Chinese Com-
munists and North Koreans violated 
numerous articles of the Geneva Con-
ventions by "their use of isolation tech-
niques, their shackling of prisoner~, 
their exposure of prisoners to the 
curiosity of the local populace, their 
inadequate medical attention, poor 
clothing, gross inadequacy of foods, 
improper hospital facilities, the in-
adequacy of Chinese doctors, and phys-
ical mistreatment of American pris-
oners."~l 
The resistance of the American pris-
oner of war to Communist methods of 
indoctrination is disclosed in one cap-
tured Chinese document which states: 
"It will take more than indoctrination 
schools to persuade most Americans 
that" their way of life is not better than 
any other."22 The variation in response 
to Communist pressure and indoctri-
nation was extreme. The ground force, 
captured early in the conflict, who 
seemed to come from units that had 
not developed high social cohesion and 
who suffered extensive mistreatment 
after capture apparently supplied most 
of thl' collahorators. The Korean con-
flict would indicate that the troops werc 
not preparl'd or trained for the type of 
POW situation to which they were ex-
Jloscd.2a 
The Kor{'an war was the first war 
in American history, except perhaps 
for the Indian struggles, which was 
not a crusade.24 At the beginning of 
thl' war the U.S. Army was inexperi-
enced. The units pulled suddenly out 
of the soft life of occupied Japan 
and thrown into a fight against a more 
numerous foe found the going tough. 
The first U.S. troops "to reach Korea 
were the 406 men of Task Force Smith, 
approximately half a battalion of the 
21st Infantry Regiment (two infantry 
companies and one battery of artillery) 
of the 24th U.S. Infantry Division, 
which arrived on 1 July 1950.2(; Ele· 
ments of the 34th Infantry arrived at 
Pusan 011 2 July 1950 with a ('ontitlllcd 
increase in the U.S. personnel com-
mitments thereafter.2G By the spring of 
1951 the 8th Army had been rebuilt 
into a tough, battle·experienced fight-
ing force.27 
The rotation policy of the Korean 
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conflict contributed to the poor accep-
tance of the war by the .U.S. troops. 
In World War II soldiers were in for 
the duration; they could only achicve 
their personal goal of getting home 
when the Government achieved its po-
litical goal of military victory. Rota-
tion in Korea divorced these two areas 
in that the aim of the majority was 
merely to mdure 9 months at the front 
and then get out. For the first time in 
American history a major war was 
being fought without adequate motiva-
tion both in Korea and the United 
States. In May 1952, during the 
Korean war, 83 percent of a cross sec-
tion sample of 2,975 university stu· 
dents were found by Cornell University 
social scientists to be essentially nega-
tive toward their military service ob· 
ligations.28 
There has he{'n almost unending 
criticism of Korean prisoners of war 
hecause they supposedly did not escape 
from their Communist captors. This 
"no escape" charge is qualified by 
critics with the statement that there 
were no escapes from "permanent pris-
on camps." The use of this distinction 
is important in that 647 men did escape 
after being captured by the Commu-
nists, but before they "were interned 
in the maximum security camps.2D The 
escape record of American prisoners 
in Korea has never been told in full 
and probably never will be. The escape 
record maintained during the hostil-
ities, the identities of escapees, and 
any details of their exploits were kept 
secret. 
Even greater obscurity surrounds un-
suC'c{'ssful escapl's. About 4 percent of 
all Army repatriates and 15 percl'nl 
of the Air Force returnees told cor-
roborated stories of having broken 
out of the places at which they were 
held by the Communists.3D 
The experience and behavior of the 
U.S. troops captured in Korea revealed 
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a need for measures designed to offset 
the enemy's planncd program of pris-
oner exploitation_ In preparing a pro-
gram of indoctrination and training 
which would provide an adequate de-
fense against the Communists, in the 
event of capture, an attempt was made 
to determine the differences between 
performances from the various services. 
Military figures indicate that U.S. 
military personnel with comparable 
backgrounds and in comparable situa-
tions reacted almost identically regard-
less of branch of service_31 
Upon repatriation the 3,323 Army 
prisoners of war were placed into one 
of three groups by Army researchers 
who studied their personal histories and 
camp conduct. The breakdown was as 
follows: 32 
Participators (IS percent) - Court-
martial and dishonorable discharge 
cases plus those who would have fallen 
in that category had they not been 
discharged from the military service. 
Middle (80 percent)-POW's about 
whom the Army had compiled little or 
no derogatory information or conflict-
ing information. 
Resistt'rs (50 percent) - POW's 
decorated or recommended for decora-
tions as a result of their meritorious he-
havior in captivity plus those who had 
committed at least two distinct acts 
of resistance in internment and against 
whom there was no derogatory infor-
mation. 
Of this group 579 middlemen and 
IR8 resisters WNC screened in an at-
tempt to determine common factors 
which differentiated those POW's who 
resisted exploitation from those who 
participated in the enemy's program. A 
sample was selected to reflcct the sault' 
proportion of ranks, races, months of 
military service, months in captivity, 
and principal places of internment. The 
following is a random sampling of 
some differences between the three clas-
sified groups :33 
1. Few significant differences in 
hack ground were found between the 
participators and the resisters. The 
participators were of lower intelligence 
than the resisters, and a higher propor-
tion of the rcsisters had bcen decoratcd 
prior to Korea. 
2. Hesisters, bccause thcy yielchl 
less readily, were interrogatcd morc ex-
tensively and intensively than were par-
tic.ipators. 
3. The participators received vir-
tually all thc preferential treatment 
givcn by the captor. 
4. The resisters received most of the 
pressure, ineluding threats and ahuses. 
meted out hy the enemy. 
5. Participators received more indoc-
trination than rcsisters. 
6. The resisters showed more con-
("(,TIl and ("ompassion for thrir fellow 
POW's than did participators. 
7. The participators came back from 
Korea in hettcr physical health than 
resisters; psychologr~aIly, however, a 
greater -numher of thc participators 
came hark with neurotic symptoms. 
8. MicIdlt'm('n were l("ss cducated, 
less int('lligcnt, and "greencr" soldicrs 
than either participators or resisters. 
9. A smaller proportion of middle-
men were married and they came into 
the Army less frequently than their 
fellow POW's with backgrounds in the 
entertainment or athletic field. 
10. Middlemcn got less of the cap-
tor"s r('wards. 
Tlw Army POW's in Korea showed 
a marked lack of esprit de corps, cohe-
siv('ness. and mutual concern. 34 
1. Tl'n perc('nt oC the POW's in-
fornll'd on 11 Cell ow POW at lrast once 
durin~ internment. 
2. Over a third of the POW's 
showed little or no concern and com-
)la~~iol1 for Iheir fpllow POW's in 
intNnmpnt and only 13 percent showed 
a strong concern. 
3. Half of thc POW's never en· 
couraged anothl'r POW to resist, and 
only 10 percl'nt gave a great deal of 
such pncouragement. 
4. One·fourth of the returning 
POW's report being aware of the out-
right mistreatment of prisoners by their 
frllow POW's, indueling heatings re-
sulting in d!'ath. 
5. Only 16 percent of all POW's 
w(~re affiliated with a prisoner camp 
organization of any type during cap-
tivity. 
The following arc some of the char-
arlt'ristics of Ihe Army POW's who 
rt'lurned from Korra.3 :; 
1. Their a"erage age at cap Lure was 
21 years. 
2. The average POW had a ninth 
;:trail(' ('Iluealion. 
:t Fivl' p('rt:enl \\'('re ofii(:('\"s. :m ppr-
('I'llt wew noncommissioned offi(!('rs, 
and 57 percent were enlisted men be- . 
low tIl(' rank of sergeant. 
4. Seventy-five percent were mem-
bprs of the Regular Army, 10 percent 
w('re from thl' Enlistpd Rpsprw and 
National Guard, and 15 percpnt were 
draftees. 
5. Eighty-five pprcent had over 3 
years of military service. 
6. Fifty percent had less than 1 
month of foreign service prior to 
Korea. 
7. Eighty-four percent had no com-
bat service prior to Korea. 
8. One percent had been POW's be-
fore. 
In summary, Army figures indicate 
that there were 5 percent resisters, 80 
percent middle ground and 15 percent 
collahorators. Among officers they 
found the middle ground shrunken be-
low its 80 percent norm; most officers, 
as would be expected in a leadership 
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group, vigorously took sides.36 Among 
men of long Army service, the middle 
ground was low as more took active 
sides - either to resist or to collab-
orate. 
The record of Negro prisoners in 
Korea indicated that 2.5 percent re-
sisted, while 21 percent collahoratl'd.37 
Other prisoners pointed out the fact 
that the Chinese spl'nt far more time 
working on the Negroes, since Com-
munists spent much time fomenting 
race haired in non-Communist lands. 
According to the figures of an Army 
psychiatrist, two officers actively rp-
sisted for l'ach who collaborated, and 
among regular Army enlisted men, one 
collahorated for every resister, with 
few in thc middlc-ground group.3S 
Most significant were the differences 
in physical condition. The resisters had 
rl'cl'ived a highcr number of hatth-
\\'ounds while few of the collahorators 
hall h('('n \\'Ollllded.:lfl 
As 10 the oYl'ra)) coniluct of pris-
olll'rs of war in KOfl·a. a major finriinl! 
of thp Bl'lldl'tspn Committee in its re-
port to the Secrptary of Defl'IHw was 
that the average serviceman shares the 
gpneral attitudl's and values of the 
Amprican puhlic of which hp is a part. 
Thpn~ is little ('vidpncc to support thp 
view expressed in some quarters that 
the serviceman lacks an awareness of 
the Communist threat. It was further 
stated that the Committee subscribed in 
full to the Report of the Defense Ad-
visory Committee on Prisoners of War 
which found that, "with notorious ex-
ceptions, the prisoner of war performed 
in a manner which did credit to his 
Service and his country."40 
Over 87,000 U:S. -officers and men 
received combat decorations for per-
formance of duty above and beyond 
the call of duty; 79, or about two and 
. a half timl's as many as those proven 
traitor, were awarded the highest 
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honor the United States can bestow, the 
C0I.1gres~ional Medal of Honor.41 
The following tribute was paid hy 
Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson 
to five Marines decorated at a Penta· 
gon ceremony on II January 1954. for 
heroism in resisting tortures at the 
hands of the Communists while held 
prisoners of war when he stated in 
part: 
They returned as victors of one 
of the strangest and most unequal en· 
coun ters of the Korean conflict. As 
prisoners of war, physically at the 
mercy of their captors, they success-
fully frustrated the enemy's concerted 
atte'mpts to obtain their collahoration 
for his evil purpose'S. AithouAh tor· 
tured, starved, and threatened with 
death, they refused to participate ... 
In doing so, they won a shining moral 
vietory.42 
Questionnaires to determine the 
attitud(' of military profrssionals to-
ward the Code of Conduct were com-
pl('t('d hy ~tudent mcrnhers of the 
Naval 'Varfare and Command and 
Staff Classes of 1967, Naval War Col-
lege. N('wport IU. Tlll'se students rep-
r('~enl each of the military s('rvices. 
C'ompris(' the top 25 percent in pro-
motion potential of their respective 
year groups, possess outstanding leader-
ship qualities, and represent a vast 
range of experience. They include 
many former commanding officers. 
Of 143 completed questionnaires, 
125 students indicated that a need 
exists for a Code of Conduct; 91 be-
lieved that the present Code of Conduct 
fulfills that need, while 12 definitely 
stated it did not; 83 stated that the 
present Code leaves no doubt in their 
mind as to what is expected of them 
should they become prisoners of war, 
and 32 indicated some doubt. A sig-
nificant factor is that 49 of the 143 
indicated that a need for improved 
training or instruction in the Code 
exists. 
VI - CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Code of Conduct grew out of the 
Korean war. Prisoner-of-war perfor-
mance was the subject of much contro-
versy, both during the fighting and 
following the cease-fire agreement. 
Numerous newspapers, magazines, 
books, and official studies contributed 
to the discussions in which such 
charges as "one of three collaborated" 
to the conclusion "that of 4,428 re-
turnees, only 425 - about six percent 
of the total prisoner population of 
7,190 - could be suspected of misbe-
havior and of which only II were con-
victed by court-martiaL" The trag-
edy of the American prisoner in 
Korea is not that he gave comfort to 
the enemy under pressure but that he 
was totally unprepared for what he 
had to endure. 
It is impossible to establish and cor-
rohorate the true account of North 
Korean prison camp happenings. How-
ever, considering the nature of the war 
and the unprecedented tactics em-
ployed by the Communist captors, 
Korean prisoners of war behaved no 
worse than those in previous wars. 
A Code of Conduct, properly insti-
tuted, can be a useful and worthwhile 
controIIing device. Functioning as an 
instructional vehicle, it can form the 
focal point of a program designed to 
"stress the importance of avoiding cap-
ture while outlining expected behavior 
if it occurs." Further, it can provide 
helpful guidance during periods of 
extreme trial when the body is weak 
and the mind falters. 
The present Code of Conduct, as 
promulgated by Executive Order Num-
her 10631 on 17 August 1955, fulfills 
the requirements and is the workable 
tool necessary to provide these ser-
,;ic('s. The Code was not intended to 
replace the Geneva Conventions Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
. War of August 12, 1949, but to render 
additional support and to meet neces-
sities when a detaining power, in fact, 
does not accept the Geneva Conven-
tions. In this light, however, the Code 
and the Conventi.on are incompatible 
and inconsistent in certain areas. These 
areas are as follows: 
1. Resistance - in that the Code 
stresses "continued resistance by all 
means available" while the Convention 
provides "humane treatment at all 
times." Carry the fight to the camp 
but expect humane treatment in re-
turn? 
2. Escape - as related to medical 
personnel and chaplains, the Code's 
requirement that they make every ef-
fort to escape and thus "desert" those 
who need their medical and religious 
services. 
3. Parole - same application to-
ward medical personnel and chaplains 
"when necessary to attend POW's in 
other hospitals, camps and labor de-
tachments or when it contributes to the 
health and well-being of a sick or 
wounded prisoner" or to sick prisoners 
who might he repatriated. 
4. Take Command - situation 
whereby one man acting as POW 
Representative and as Senior in Com-
mand "is faced with separate require-
ments of action originating from the 
Code and the Convention." 
5. Name, Rank, Service Num-
her, Dale of Birth - conflicts with 
373 
the Convention's "Capture Card and 
pers,?nal correspondence" privileges. 
To better prepare the American ser-
viceman for the conflict now existing 
in Southeast Asia and for future Com-
munist challenges, the following is 
strongly recommended: 
1. Increased efforts in military train-
ing, discipline, and esprit de corps. 
2. Adequate and thorough indoctri-
nation of alI individuals in the proper 
methods and techniques to resist cap-
ture, evade, escape, and survive if cap-
tured. 
3. Increase-the will to resist of every 
individual through an intensive study 
of Am!;rican delllocracy as compared 
to Communist ideologies. Insure that 
the fighting man understands' his 
proud heritage. 
4. An intensification in the inculcat-
ing of religious motivations to provide 
the necessary weapons of faith and 
courage. 
5. Intensive training to improve and 
maintain physical and mental endur-
ance. 
6. Insure an adequate understand-
ing of individual rights and I privileges 
as a captive, as pertains to interna-
tional and military law. 
7. That the Code of Conduct or its 
amplifying directives/instructions he 
revised to correct the incompatibilities 
and inconsistencies with the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. 
8. That a renewed effort be made to 
insure that Code of Conduct instruction 
and training programs are established 
and are being properly administered 
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APPENDIX - QUESTIONNAIRES 
CODE OF CONDUCT 
From 143 questionnaires completed by Naval War College students of the Naval Warfare 
and School of Command and Staff Class('s of 1967, three of the questions immediately pertinent 
to the conclusions of this paper arc prl'.sented. The numbers in parenthesis indicate total 
checking that particular answer. 
1. Do you believe that a need exists for a Code of Conduct? (125) Yes, (18) No. 
2. Do you believe that the pres(,nt Code of Conduct fulfills that need? (102) Yes, (18) No, 
(15) N.A. (Not Applicable) (4) Partially, (4) Not Answered. 
3. Does the present Code of Conduct leave any douht in your mind as to what is expected of 
you, should you become a prisoner of war? (36) Yes, (l03) No, (4) Not Answered. 
The following is a random sampling of some of the answers received from those who believe 
that there is no need for a Code of Conduct: 
"The essence of the Code is inherent in hasic Marine training with 
emphasis on the individual Marine's responsibility to his fellow Marine •.. " 
"Not for the purpose and in the sensI: it now exists. Currently it is nothing 
more than quasi·criminal statute originated for the purpose of prosccution 
... " "It is a redundant Gode that merely mouths in a general way oaths of 
office and pledges of allegiance that have existed for some time ••• " "The 
present Code is an inadequate attempt to correct a basic fault in American 
education .. .'. "Loyalty to one's country is built through an understanding 
and appreciation of the basic principles of that country, not simply signing 
a pledge ... " "A man's conduct is a result of his character; written words 
will not supply the deficiencies ... " "Those who lack loyalty, patriotism, 
or responsihility will not achieve these qualities by signing a piece of paper 
that they have read and understood a Code . . ." "The present Code is 
humiliating to the professional by its very existence .•• " "It is a collection 
of platitudes which a military fighting man should not have to carry around 
on a card as a hip pocket reminder •.. " 
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